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COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN EVOLUTION
I. INTRODUCTION
At the core of the law of corporate governance is the business judgment
rule. In application, the business judgment rule precludes the need for
extensive judicial interference in the management and operation of
commercial enterprises and enables corporate officials to focus their
attention on running the business and making a profit.' By using this
construct the courts are able in most instances to avoid becoming entangled
in the frequent internecine disputes that arise between corporate
shareholders and the officers, directors, and executives who manage the
corporation.
In recent years, the federal and state judiciaries have laid the
groundwork for achieving the same result in a broader range of commercial
disputes by strictly enforcing contractual agreements to arbitrate between
businesses, businesses and consumers, and employers and employees. 2 By
deferring to contractually-provided arbitration in commercial disputes that
otherwise would be the subject of lawsuits, the courts hope to provide an
effective vehicle for reducing the current logjam in civil dockets3 while at
1 The business judgment rule "is a presumption that in making a business decision the
directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief
that the action taken was in the best interests of the company." Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d
805, 812 (Del. 1984). See generally S. Samuel Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited,
8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 93 (1979); Dennis J. Block et al., The Role of the Business Judgment
Rule in Shareholder Litigation at the Turn of the Decade, 45 Bus. LAW. 469, 489-97 (1990).
2 See, e.g., Lee v. Chica, 983 F.2d 883 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 287
(1992); Brown v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 994 F.2d 775 (1lth Cir. 1993); Moncharsh
v. Heily & Blase, 832 P.2d 899 (Cal. 1993). See also David E. Feller, End of the Trilogy:
The Declining State of LaborArbitration, 48 ARB. J., Sept. 1993, at 18, 22; Bret F. Randall,
Note, The History, Application, and Policy of the Judicially Created Standards of Review for
Arbitration Awards, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REv. 759, 759 (1992); Richard E. Speidel, Arbitration
of Statutory Rights Under the Federal Arbitration Act: The Case for Reform, 4 OHIO ST. J. ON
Disp. RESOL. 157, 204 (1989); Thomas J. Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration, 63
IND. L.J. 425, 439 (1988).
3 Much has been written about the overcrowded status of the civil dockets in the nation's
courts, particularly the federal courts. See, e.g., SENATE CoMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, THE
JUDICIAL IMPROVEMENTS Acr OF 1990, S. REP. No. 101-416, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6808-10; RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 59-93 (1985); Robert G. Bone, Statistical Adjudication: Rights,
Justice, and Utility in a World of Process Scarcity, 46 VAND. L. RLv. 561, 563 (1993); Kim
Dayton, The Myth of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts, 76 IowA L. REv.
889, 889-90 (1991); R. William Ide n1, It's ime to Work Together, 80 A.B.A. J., Feb. 1994,
at 8 (reporting that total civil filings in the state courts increased by 33% between 1984 and
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the same time simplifying, shortening, and reducing the expense of the
commercial dispute resolution process.4 This phenomenon and the challenge
it presents to commercial arbitration are the genesis of this article.
II. THE NEED FOR DIALOGUE
Commercial arbitration is at a critical juncture in its movement from the
periphery of the civil justice system to its center stage. Although
commercial arbitration was employed in the United States as far back as
colonial times, its utility prior to enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA)5 was hampered by the reluctance of the courts to enforce agreements
to arbitrate future disputes. 6 Even after the passage of the FAA, and despite
the widespread adoption by the states of the Uniform Arbitration Act
(UAA), 7 during the period from the mid-1920s to the mid-1980s
commercial arbitration lay fallow.
In the last ten years, spurred largely by the U.S. Supreme Court's
abandonment of its long-standing skepticism as to the suitability of
contractually-provided arbitration as a method for adjudicating commercial
disputes otherwise appropriate for adjudication in court, including claimed
1991); Martin H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson, Privatizing Justice: A Jurisprudential
Perspective on Labor and Employment Arbitration from the Steelworkers Trilogy to Gilmer, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 1187, 1187 (1993); Robert M. Parker & Leslie J. Hagin, Two Judges:
Differing Values and Visions - "ADR" Techniques in the Reformation Model of Civil Dispute
Resolution, 46 SMU L. REV. 1905, 1906-11 (1993); J. Clifford Wallace, Tackling the
Caseload Crisis, 80 A.B.A. J., June 1994, at 88. However, not all observers agree that a
.caseload crisis" really exists. See, e.g., Marc S. Galanter, The Day After the Litigation
Explosion, 46 MD. L. REv. 3 (1986); Hon. Jack B. Weinstein, After Fity Years of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure: Are the Barriers to Justice Being Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
1901, 1907-10 (1989).
4See, e.g., Ultracashmere House, Ltd. v. Meyer, 664 F.2d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir.
1981) ("The purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act was to relieve congestion in the courts
and to provide parties with an alternative method for dispute resolution that would be speedier
and less costly than litigation."). See also Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Using Arbitration
to Achieve Justice, 40 ARB. J., Dec. 1985, at 3, 6; Main & Ladenson, supra note 3, at 1187;
Michael Segalla, Survey: The Speed and Cost of Complex Commercial Arbitrations, 46 ARB.
J., Dee. 1991, at 12; G. Richard Shell, Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel Effects of
CommercialArbitration, 35 UCLA L. REv. 623, 626 (1988).
5 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §1 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
6 See I. IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAw § 4.3 (1994); William M.
Howard, The Evolution of Contractually Mandated Arbitration, 48 ARB. J., Sept. 1993, at 27.
7 UNIF. ARB. AcT, §1 7 U.L.A. 1 (1955) [hereinafter U.A.A].
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violations of federal law,8 the use of commercial arbitration has begun to
accelerate. Today, as a result of this turnaround in the attitudes of the
8 The Supreme Court's skeptical attitude towards commercial arbitration was best
illustrated in WVilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). In Wilko, the plaintiff customer sued his
brokerage firm for violations of the Securities Act of 1933, alleging fraudulent
misrepresentations. The defendant brokerage firm insisted that the customer was obligated to
arbitrate the claim on the basis of an existing agreement to do so. The Supreme Court held
that the customer could not be compelled to arbitrate the claim. In discussing arbitration, the
Court remarked:
Even though the provisions of the Securities Act, advantageous to the buyer,
apply, their effectiveness in application is lessened in arbitration as compared to
judicial proceedings. Determination of the quality of a commodity or the amount
of money due under a contract is not the type of issue here involved. 'Iis case
requires subjective findings on the purpose and knowledge of an alleged violator
of the Ace. They must be not only determined but applied by the arbitrators
without judicial instruction on the law. As their award may be made without
explanation of their reasons and without a complete record of their proceedings,
the arbitrators' conception of the legal meaning of such statutory requirements as
"burden of proof," "reasonable care," or "material fact," cannot be examined.
Power to vacate an award is limited.
346 U.S. at 435-36.
By the mid-1980s, however, the Court's assessment of the value and viability of
commercial arbitration had changed. For example, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1984), the Court held that an agreement to arbitrate
"all disputes, controversies or differences that may arise" required the arbitration of alleged
violations of the antitrust laws. The Court noted, "[w]e are well past the time when judicial
suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and of the competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited
the development of arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution." 473 U.S. at 626-
27. See also Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983) (noting that the FAA indicates a "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements"); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (holding that state statutes that
restrict or prevent the arbitration of claims that otherwise would be covered by agreements to
arbitrate are subject to preemption by the FAA); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (holding that claims arising under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 are arbitrable, if covered by an agreement between customer and broker to
arbitrate); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, (1989)
(overruling Wilko v. Swan and holding that a claimed violation of the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organization (RICO) Act is a proper subject for arbitration); Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (holding that alleged violations of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act are subject to compulsory arbitration where the employee
347
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federal and state courts regarding the use of arbitration as a surrogate for
judicial adjudication of commercial disputes, the likelihood of a successful
effort to resist enforcement of a contractual arbitration clause, or of a loser
in arbitration securing vacation of an unfavorable award in court, is remote
indeed.
Increasing numbers of more complex commercial disputes, involving
larger amounts in controversy, are being routinely submitted to arbitration.9
A substantial number of commercial contracts contain boilerplate arbitration
clauses providing that virtually all controversies arising between the parties
to those contracts will be subject to final and binding arbitration. 10 Thus,
for example, agreements to arbitrate contractual and related disputes are
routinely included in sales contracts, construction contracts, broker-
customer contracts, loan agreements, partnership agreements, and
employment and employment-related contracts.
signed, as part of his securities registration application, an agreement to arbitrate disputes
arising out of his employment); Allied-Bruce Terminix Co., Inc., v. Dobson, 115 S.Ct. 834
(1995) (the interstate commerce language, contained in Section 2 of the FAA, reaches to the
limits of the Commerce Clause power). See generally Howard, supra note 6, at 27;
Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 426-27 nn.2-3; Henry C. Strickland, The Federal Arbitration
Act's Interstate Commerce Requirement: What's Left for State Arbitration Law? 21 HOFsTRA
L. REv. 385, 388-400 (1992).
9 For example, commercial arbitration filings with the American Arbitration Association
rose from 6448 in 1981 to 13,603 in 1992. Segalla, supra note 4, at 12. Commercial case
filings in 1993 were down somewhat from 1990, but the value of the claims and counterclaims
filed in 1993 reached $6 billion, almost twice the 1992 level. Securities case filings increased
from 55 in 1985 to 635 in 1993. Ted E. Pons, AAA Business Expanded in 1993, DisP. RESOL.
TIMEs, Spring 1994, at 1. In 1986, Robert Coulson, the former president of the AAA, stated
that "[in less than twenty years, the use of commercial arbitration has increased by over
250%." Douglas R. Davis, Note, Overextension of Arbiral Authority: Punitive Damages and
Issues of Arbitrability-Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Sys., Inc., 65 WASH. L. REv.
695, 696 (1990) (citing Comment, The Scope of Modern Arbitral Awards, 62 TUL. L. REV.
1113, 1113 n.2 (1988)).
10 The non-profit Center for Public Resources has prepared and championed a
.corporate pledge" movement, in which large companies pledge themselves to explore the use
of ADR techniques, prior to litigation, in the event of a dispute between signatories. Over half
of the Fortune 500 companies, and more than 600 corporations in all, have signed the
"corporate pledge." Victoria Cundiff, Companies are Seeking Litigation Alternatives, NAT'L
L.J., May 17, 1993, at S25, cited in Lisa Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of Court-
Connected ADR: A Critique of Federal Court-Annexed Arbitration Programs, 141 U. PA. L.
REV. 2169, 2189 (1993). Numerous trade and professional associations use or recommend the
use of arbitration under the AAA. For an extensive list, see Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 431
n.24.
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It is this increasing routinization of commercial arbitration, and its
progress toward institutionalization as an integral part of the legal
framework for resolving commercial disputes that creates the need for a
comprehensive, thoughtful dialogue. Litigators, business executives,
arbitrators, the organizations that provide arbitration services, the courts,
and legislators are obliged to enter into a deliberate evaluation of the
process and the neutrals who serve thereunder, with an eye toward ensuring
that the accelerating evolution now underway produces a dispute resolution
model that truly is cost effective; procedurally predictable and fair; and
capable of consistently producing accurate and correct results in a wide
array of controversies. The legal and related research reported in the
literature to date has failed to generate this type of wide-ranging dialogue.
For the most part, the commentary in the literature has consisted of
legal analyses of relatively narrow topics" or empirical studies that describe
specific subsets of the current practice of commercial arbitration. 12 These
11 Some topics, such as the arbitrability of statutory rights, have been the subject of
considerable academic attention. See, e.g., Malin & Ladenson, supra note 3, at 1187; G.
Richard Shell, The Role of Public Law in Private Dispute Resolution: Reflections on
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 26 AM. Bus. L.J. 397 (1988); Richard E. Speidel,
Arbitration of Statutory Rights Under the Federal Arbitration Act: The Case for Reform, 4
OHIO ST. J. DisP. RasOL. 157 (1989). The arbitrability of particular types of disputes, other
than those involving statutory rights, has also been explored. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Nelson,
Judge-Made Law and the Presumption of Arbitrability: David L. Threlkeld & Co. v.
Metallgesellschaft Ltd., 58 BROOK. L. Ruv. 279 (1992); Strickland, supra note 8 (discussing
the jurisdictional reach of the FAA); Davis, supra note 9, at 695. The proper standard for
judicial review of arbitral awards has been analyzed on several occasions. See, e.g., Brad A.
Galbraith, Note, Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards in Federal Court: Contemplating
the Use and Utility of the "Manifest Disregard" of the Law Standard, 27 IND. L. REv. 241
(1993); Bret F. Randall, Note, The History, Application, and Policy of the Judicially Created
Standards of Review for Arbitration Awards, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REv. 759 (1992); Michael J.
Smith, Note, Efficient Injustice: The Demise of the "Substantial Injustice" Exception to
Arbitral Finality, 8 1. ON DisP. REsOL. 209 (1993); Speidel, supra note 2. See also Lewis B.
Kaden, Judges and Arbitrators: Observations on the Scope of Judicial Review, 80 COLUM. L.
REv. 267 (1980) (focusing on labor arbitration). Other specific issues have also been
addressed. See, e.g., Edward Brunet, Arbitration and Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L. Rnrv.
81 (1992) (advocating the application of procedural due process principles to commercial
arbitration); Shell, supra note 4 (discussing the use of claim and issue preclusion in
commercial arbitration).
12 Probably the most widely cited such studies are those described by Professor Thomas
Stipanowich, supra note 2, and Professor Soia Mentschikoff, in Commercial Arbitration, 61
COLUM. L. REv. 846 (1961). The results of a 1985-86 survey conducted by the Forum
Committee on the Construction Industry and the Construction Litigation Division of the
349
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efforts, while useful in initiating the dialogue the Authors envision, are not
sufficient to generate the type of colloquy required to advance the state of
the art of commercial arbitration and ensure its maturation into a device
capable of routinely serving as a substitute for traditional litigation in a
broad range of commercial disputes.
The Authors assert that like the Total Quality Management (TQM)
movement that has captured so much attention in recent years in the
manufacturing and service sectors of American society, 13 the organizations
and individuals involved in commercial arbitration must adopt a customer-
oriented perspective that consistently drives the practice in the direction of
satisfying the expectations of both those who utilize commercial arbitration
and the public policy makers who sanction its use. It is the purpose of this
article to set the parameters for a concrete dialogue among those with a
stake in ensuring the institutionalization of commercial arbitration that will
facilitate that result. The focuses of this dialogue must be on developing a
vision of the process at maturity; fashioning an archetype of the mainline
commercial arbitrator who will be the key to its effective operation; and
ascertaining the measures necessary to bring both of those constructs to
reality.
In the Sections below, the Authors first will briefly describe the legal
framework for commercial arbitration. The commentary will then turn to a
American Bar Association Section on Litigation provided much of the data analyzed and
discussed in Professor Stipanowich's article. Professor Mentschikoff's study surveyed and
examined arbitration conducted independently by various trade associations, and arbitration
conducted through the American Arbitration Association. There have, of course, been other
studies. The General Accounting Office has produced reports on the arbitration of disputes
between securities firms and their customers. See Securities Arbitration: How Investors Fare,
GAO/GGD-92-74 (May 11, 1992) [hereinafter Securities Arbitration]. It has also produced
reports on the arbitration of employment discrimination suits between securities finns and
their registered representatives. See Employment Discrimination: How Registered
Representatives Fare in Discrimination Disputes, GAO/IHEHS-94-17 (Mar. 30, 1994)
[hereinafter Employment Discrimination]. Other organizations, most notably the American
Arbitration Association, also conduct surveys from time to time dealing with various aspects
of commercial arbitration. The results of such surveys occasionally appear in print later on.
See, e.g., Segalla, supra note 4; Thomas L. Watkins, Assessing Arbitrator Competence: A
Preliminary Regional Survey, 47 ARB. J., June 1992, at 43. Nonetheless, there is a dearth of
reliable, carefully considered empirical research that goes beyond merely describing certain
dimensions of the current practice. There is much we do not know about commercial
arbitration.
13 See W. Edwards Deming, Improvement of Quality and Productivity through Action by
Management, NAT'L PROD. Rnv., Winter 1981-82, at 12-22. See also JAMEs W. DEAN &
JAMsS R. EvANS, TOTAL QUALITY: MANAGEMENT, ORGANIZATION, AND STRATEGY (1994).
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description of the major characteristics, attributes, and shortcomings of
contemporary commercial arbitration, including a juxtaposition of the
process with traditional litigation. Proceeding from this foundation, the
Authors will attempt to provide a framework for the dialogue envisioned
above by articulating what they believe to be the key characteristics of a
viable mature commercial arbitration mechanism and by describing the
archetype of the commercial arbitrator who will oversee it.
II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
Commercial arbitration has been practiced in the United States for
several hundred years. 14 For most of that time, the common law has been
the basis for its use. It was not until the 1920s that enabling and
empowering statutes began to appear, both at the federal and state level,
with the avowed purpose of remedying the shortcomings of common law
arbitration.15
Common law arbitration was based on contract principles. Thus, an
agreement to arbitrate a dispute could be entered into much the same way
that any contract could be entered into, but with some significant, and often
disabling limitations. The most serious limitation was that agreements to
arbitrate were revocable at any time prior to award.16 Furthermore,
agreements to arbitrate future disputes were generally deemed void, as
against public policy. 17 Thus, although arbitration could function as the
final method for resolving a commercial dispute, there was no assurance at
the inception of the agreement to arbitrate that it would so function. Today,
common law arbitration still exists, although its use is limited to those
situations in which the relevant state or federal arbitration statute does not
apply.' 8
The potency of modem commercial arbitration comes from statutes. It
is the willingness of the courts to enforce agreements to arbitrate that makes
commercial arbitration a plausible alternative to litigation in the courts. At
least at the outset, judicial willingness to enforce agreements to arbitrate and
14 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 6, § 4.3; Mentschikoff, supra note 12, at 854-56.
15 Howard, supra note 6, at 28-29; Strickland, supra note 8, at 388-90. See also
RODMAN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 3.1 (1984).
16 Howard, supra note 6, at 28; Strickland, supra note 8, at 389.
17 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 6, § 4.3.2.2. See also Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S.
445, 452 (1874); United States Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F.
1006, 1008 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
18 RODMAN, supra note 15, § 3.1; DOMKE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION § 3.02 (1968); Daniels Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Jordan, 657 P.2d 624 (N.M.
1982).
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to enforce arbitral awards, was procured through legislation. 19 At the
federal level, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) is the principal source of
authority. 20 Almost every state has an arbitration statute of some sort. The
predominant statute, enacted in substantially similar form in some 34 states,
is the Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA). 21 Of the remaining states, all but
two (Alabama and West Virginia) have statutes which provide for the
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate both existing and future disputes.22
A. General Parameters Of The Law Of Commercial Arbitration
While there are differences between the Federal Arbitration Act and the
Uniform Arbitration Act, they are similar in purpose and operation. 23 As a
result, the basic legal contours of commercial arbitration are well
established and generally consistent. Agreements to arbitrate disputes
arising in the future, as well as existing disputes, are specifically
enforceable by application to the appropriate court.24 The parties are free to
draft their own procedure, or to use one of several neutral organizations that
provide arbitration services (hereinafter "neutral appointing authorities"),
such as the American Arbitration Association. The parties may select their
own arbitrator(s), or they may ask to have an arbitrator appointed, either by
a neutral appointing authority, or, if need be, by the court.25 Arbitrator(s)
19 See Howard, supra note 6, at 28; Nelson, supra note 11, at 279, 280-81; Strickland,
supra note 8, at 389.
20 For a brief history of the enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act, see Howard,
supra note 6, at 28-30; Nelson, supra note 11, 280-83.
21 The statutory citations are collected in 7 UNIF. LAWS ANN. 1 (Supp. 1993).
22 Both Alabama and West Virginia have arbitration statutes, but they apply only to
existing disputes. See ALA. CODE §§ 6-6-1 to 6-6-16 (1975); W.VA. CODE §§ 55-10-1 to 55-
10-8 (1994). In Mississippi, construction contracts may provide for the arbitration of future
disputes. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-15-101 to 11-15-143 (1981). See generally RODMAN, supra
note 15, §§ 3.7, 3.8 (Supp. 1992). The continuing vitality of these statutes is highly doubtful.
In Allied-Bruce Terminix Co., Inc. v. Dobson, 115 S.Ct. 834 (1995), the Supreme Court held
that Section 2 of the FAA, which makes enforceable a written agreement to arbitrate in a
contract "evidencing a transaction involving commerce," preempts Alabama law to the
contrary.
23 See MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 6, § 5.4.2 for a compilation of the differences
between the FAA and the UAA.
24 9 U.S.C. §§ 2-4 (FED. ARBITRATION AcT §§ 2-4) (1994) [hereinafter F.A.A]; UNIF.
ARBITRATION AcT §2 [hereinafter U.A.A.].
25 9 U.S.C. § 5 (F.A.A. § 5) (1994); U.A.A. § 3.
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ordinarily have considerable discretion as to the conduct of the hearing. 26
Arbitrator(s) are not bound by the rules of evidence, 27 unless the parties so
stipulate, nor is a written opinion usually required. 28
The arbitrator's award may be enforced by application to the
appropriate court.29 The grounds for judicial review of the award are quite
limited. Although the precise terminology varies, under both the FAA and
the UAA a court may vacate an arbitral award only if the arbitrator(s)
exceeded their powers, or if corruption, fraud, evident partiality, or
arbitrator misconduct can be shown.30 In addition, both statutes authorize a
reviewing court to modify an award that on its face contains a material
miscalculation or mistake in the description of any person, thing, or
property referred to in the award.3 ' An award may also be modified where
the arbitrators have determined a matter not submitted to them. 32
In addition to these statutory grounds for vacation of awards, courts
have on occasion resorted to more generalized bases for overturning an
arbitral award.' Several phrases recur in the case law. Thus, there are
opinions which suggest an award will not be enforced if it violates an
accepted principle of public policy. 33 Other cases indicate an award will not
be enforced if the arbitrator acted with "manifest disregard" of the relevant
law.34 Still other cases indicate a willingness to vacate awards that are found
26 Robbins v. Day, 954 F.2d 679, 682, 685 (1lth Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom.
Robbins v. PaineWebber, Inc. 113 S. Ct. 201 (1992); Forsythe Int'l, S.A. v. Gibbs Oil Co.
of Texas, 915 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1990); U.A.A. § 5. See generally MACNEIL ET AL., supra
note 6, §§ 32.1.2, 32.3.1.1; OEHMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 6.8 (1987); RODMAN,
supra note 15, § 19.1.
2 7 Robbins, 954 F.2d at 685; State v. P.G. Miron Constr. Co., 512 N.W.2d 499, 503
(Vis. 1994); OEHMKE, supra note 26, § 11.9.
28 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598
(1960); Falmestock & Co. v. Waltman, 935 F.2d 512, 516 (2d Cir. 1991); Associated Constr.
Co. v. Molitemo Stone Sales, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 15, 16 (D. Conn. 1992).
29 9 U.S.C. §§ 9, 13 (F.A.A. §§ 9, 13) (1994); U.A.A. §§ 11, 14.
30 9 U.S.C. § 10 (F.A.A. § 10) (1994); U.A.A. §12.
31 9 U.S.C. § 11 (F.A.A. § 11) (1994); U.A.A. § 13.
32 9 U.S.C. § 11(b) (F.A.A. § 11(b)) (1994); U.A.A. § 13(a)(2).
33 See, e.g., Seymour v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 988 F.2d 1020, 1023 (10th Cir.
1993); Crosson v. N.Y. State S.Ct. Officers Ass'n., 596 N.Y.S.2d 1007, 1010-11 (Sup. Ct.
1993).
34 See, e.g., Lee v. Chica, 983 F.2d 883, 885 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct.
287 (1993); Eljer Mfg., Inc. v. Kowin Dev. Corp., 14 F.3d 1250, 1254 (7th Cir. 1994);
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1986).
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to be "arbitrary and capricious. " 35 By no means, however, would it be
accurate to say that all, or even most, courts recognize these nonstatutory
grounds. Indeed, even in the relatively uncommon event that a nonstatutory
ground for overturning an arbitral award is cited, a statutory basis -
typically, that the arbitrator exceeded his or her authority - can usually be
invoked as the ultimate legal basis for rejecting the award. 36
It is a fundamental principle of arbitration law that an award will not be
vacated merely because the arbitrator made a mistake of fact or law. 37 Thus,
although the precise standard of review may vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction, it is universally acknowledged that arbitral awards are not
easily vacated. 38 This principle is a key attribute of commercial arbitration.
It is one of the primary ways of distinguishing arbitration from litigation.39
B. Some Unsettled Questions
While the cloth of commercial arbitration certainly remains intact, an
examination of the recent case law indicates some fraying around the edges.
Issues pertaining to the standard for determining whether a dispute is
arbitrable under the parties' contract; the related question of what disputes
35 See, e.g., Brown v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 994 F.2d 775, 781 (1lth Cir.
1993); Nitram, Inc. v. Industrial Risk Insurers, 848 F. Supp. 162, 166-67 (M.D. Fla. 1994);
Wichinsky v. Mosa, 847 P.2d 727, 731 (Nev. 1993).
36 See, e.g., Eljer Mfg., 14 F.3d at 1256; Valentine Sugars, Inc. v. Donau Corp., 981
F.2d 210, 213 (5th Cir. 1993); Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 20 Cal. Rptr.
2d 73, 77, review granted and opinion superseded, 858 P.2d 567 (1993). See also Federated
Dep't Stores, Inc. v. J.V.B. Indus., Inc., 894 F.2d 862, 866 (6th Cir. 1990).
37 Marra Constructors, Inc. v. Cleveland Metroparks Sys., 612 N.E.2d 806 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1993); J.J.F. of Palm Beach, Inc. v. State Farm Fire Casualty Co., 634 So. 2d 1089
(Fla. App. 1994); Lane v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 599 N.Y.S.2d 101 (1993); Luster v.
Collins, 15 Cal. App. 4th 1338, 1344-45 (1993).
38 See, e.g., Robbins v. Day, 954 F.2d 679 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom.
Robbins v. PaineWebber, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 201 (1992); Wall St. Assoc. v. Becker, Paribas,
Inc., 818 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), aff'd, 27 F.3d 845 (2d Cir. 1994); Azcon Constr.
Co. v. Golden Hills Resort, Inc., 498 N.W.2d 630, 635 (S.D. 1993); Allied Am. Ins. Co. v.
Culp, 612 N.E.2d 41, 43-44 (111. App. Ct. 1993); Warner v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,
624 A.2d 304, 305 (R.I. 1993).
39 The most commonly cited reason for the finality of arbitral awards is that arbitration
is precisely what the parties bargained for. In exchange for a quicker, less expensive
resolution of the dispute, the parties trade away some level of assurance that the correct result
on the merits has been reached. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985); Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 832 P.2d 899 (Cal.
1992); Mellroy v. PaineWebber, Inc., 989 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1993).
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properly may be made the subject of compulsory arbitration; and the
appropriate standard of judicial review of arbitral awards have all drawn
considerable attention from the appellate courts. It is not surprising that
these three questions should dominate the recent case law. For with the
increased emphasis (and, at times, insistence) on the use of alternatives to
litigation, the volume of commercial arbitration cases has risen
dramatically. 40 Given the flexibility and lack of detailed structure of the
proceeding itself and the difficulty of obtaining substantive review of the
award, it is not surprising to see greater pressure applied at the beginning of
the process (arbitrability) and at its conclusion (standards of judicial review
of the award). Indeed, it is predictable that if the process itself does not
conform to widely understood and accepted rules, the only place where
challenges to the process can take place are at its beginning and at its end.
1. Arbitrability
Whether a dispute is subject to arbitration at all (i.e. the issue of
substantive arbitrability) is a question frequently litigated. In such instances,
the issue is whether the language in the agreement to arbitrate covers the
dispute at hand. The initial inquiry centers on who decides questions of
arbitrability: the courts or the arbitrator(s)? 41 In general, if the FAA
applies, the court will make the determination. 42 If the UAA applies, it is
more likely that the arbitrator will make the substantive arbitrability
determination, particularly if the language of the agreement to arbitrate is
ambiguous. 43
4 0 The American Arbitration Association (AAA) reported 63,171 new case filings in
1993, an increase of 7% over 1992, and an increase of 59% over 1984. The AAA reported
12,872 "pure" commercial case filings in 1993, not counting securities cases. Although
commercial case filings did not increase over 1992 levels, the value of the new commercial
case filings rose to $6 billion, an amount almost twice that of 1992. Commercial case filings
include both arbitration and mediation claims. Pons, supra note 9, at 1. See also Segalla,
supra note 4, at 13.
41 Questions of procedural arbitrability are generally deemed appropriate for decision by
the arbitrator. See 1.S. Joseph Co., Inc. v. Michigan Sugar Co., 803 F.2d 396, 398 n.1 (8th
Cir. 1986) (citing Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d 743, 747-49 (9th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1141 (1986)).
4 2 Mitsublshi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. 614; Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. McCoy, 995
F.2d 649 (6th Cir. 1993); Magallanes Inv., Inc. v. Circuit Sys., Inc., 994 F.2d 1214 (7th Cir.
1993); Caudle v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 614 N.E.2d 1312 (11. App. Ct. 1993). See
generally MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 6, § 15.1.4.
43 Glenn H. Johnson Constr. Co. v. Board of Educ., 614 N.E.2d 208 (Ill. App. Ct.
1993); Orthopedic Physical Therapy Ctr. v. Sports Therapy Ctrs., Ltd., 621 A.2d 402 (Me.
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There is a consistent body of case law to guide the courts in deciding
issues of substantive arbitrability. The foremost principle is that the intent
of the parties, as reflected in the agreement to arbitrate, is determinative of
whether a given dispute is subject to arbitration. In determining that mutual
intent, the courts are precluded from looking to the merits of the underlying
dispute. 44 "[The court is limited to ascertaining 'whether the party seeking
arbitration is making a claim which on its face is governed by the contract
[to arbitrate]."' 45 "[Tjhere is a presumption of arbitrability in the sense that
'[ain order to arbitrate the particular [claim] should not be denied unless it
may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not
susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.'" 46 The
"presumption of arbitrability is overcome only by a definitive showing that
the dispute in question is outside the coverage of the arbitration clause."47
1993); Gold Coast Mall, Inc. v. Larmar Corp., 468 A.2d 91 (Md. 1983); Portland Ass'n of
Teachers v. School Dist. No. 1, 555 P.2d 943 (Or. App. 1976); Layne-Minnesota Co. v.
Regents of the Univ. of Minnesota, 123 N.W.2d 371 (Minn. 1963).
44 PaineWebber, Inc. v. Hofmann, 984 F.2d 1372, 1377 (3d Cir. 1993) ("In resolving
the arbitrability of particular claims, however, 'a court is not to rule on the potential merits of
the underlying claims,' no matter how frivolous the claims may appear to the court." (quoting
AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)));
Kelly v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 985 F.2d 1067, 1069 (11th Cir. 1993)
(citing Dean Witter Reynolds v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985)); Prima Paint Corp. v.
Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402-04 (1967).
45 Bristol Farmers Market & Auction Co. v. Arlen Realty & Dev. Corp., 589 F.2d
1214, 1217 (3d Cir. 1978) (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363
U.S. 564, 568 (1960)). See also International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers,
Inc., AFL-CIO v. Aloha Airlines, Inc., 790 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1986) ("When faced with
a petition to compel arbitration, a court's role is limited to 'ascertaining whether the party
seeking arbitration is making a claim which on its face is governed by the contract.'")
(quoting United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. Alpha Beta Co., 736 F.2d 1371,
1374 (9th Cir. 1984) (quoting United Steel Workers of Am., 363 U.S. at 568)).
46 Hofmann, 984 F.2d at 1377 (quoting AT&T Technologies, 475 U.S. at 649, (quoting
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83
(1960))). See also PaineWebber v. Hartmann, 921 F.2d 507, 511 (3d Cir. 1990) ("The sole
issue is whether it may be said with positive assurance that the [particular] dispute falls outside
the scope of the agreement [to arbitrate.]"); S+L+H S.p.A. v. Miller-St. Nazianz, Inc., 988
F.2d 1518, 1524 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing International Ass'n of Machinists v. Fansteel, Inc.,
900 F.2d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 851 (1990)).
47 Costle v. Fremont Indem. Co., 839 F. Supp. 265, 272 (D. Vt. 1993) (citing
Associated Brick Mason Contractors of Greater N.Y. v. Harrington, 820 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir.
1987)).
356
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN EVOLUTION
"[D]oubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in
favor of arbitration ... .48
However, the bias in favor of arbitration is certainly not uniform. For
example, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the standard
"broad clause" arbitration provision used by the AAA is not of itself
enough to resolve questions of arbitrability, unless a clear indication that the
dispute at issue was meant to be arbitrated can be ascertained. 49 The fact
that a determination of arbitrability is subject to de novo review 50 adds a
further wrinkle: it makes appeal of such a determination a potential means
for delaying the process, while offering a second chance at avoiding
arbitration altogether.
2. What Disputes Are Subject to Compulsory Arbitration?
Related to the question of arbitrability is the question of what disputes
are appropriate, as a matter of law, for submission to compulsory
arbitration. It can be maintained that as a matter of contract any dispute may
properly be the subject of compulsory arbitration, if that is what the parties
agree to. It has never been that simple. There have always been exceptions.
For many years, for example, securities fraud claimants could not be forced
to arbitrate their claims, even if an agreement to arbitrate disputes had been
signed.51 Nonetheless, spurred by several recent decisions by the Supreme
Court, the range of disputes which may be arbitrated is expanding.
Beginning in 1985, the Supreme Court has, in succession, held that
claimed violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act,52 the Racketeer Corrupt
48 Progressive Casualty Ins. Co. v. C.A. Reaseguradora Nacional De Venezuela, 991
F.2d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting Mercury Constr. Corp. v. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. 1,
24-25 (1983) quoted in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 626 (1985). See also Hofinann, 984 F.2d at 1377 (quoting AT&T Technologies, 475
U.S. at 650); Ritzel Communications, Inc. v. Mid-American Cellular Tel. Co., 989 F.2d 966,
968-69 (8th Cir. 1993); Zink v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 13 F.3d 330,
332 (10th Cir. 1993); Meadows Indem. Co. Ltd. v. Baccala & Shoop Ins. Serv., Inc., 760 F.
Supp. 1036, 1043 (E.D.N.Y. 1991); Marchak v. Claridge Commons, Inc., 633 A.2d 531,
535 (N.J. 1993).
49 Virginia Carolina Tools, Inc. v. International Tool Supply, Inc., 984 F.2d 113 (4th
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 2930 (1993).
5 0 Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d 753 (11th Cir. 1994);
Wheat, First Securities, Inc. v. Green, 993 F.2d 814 (1 1th Cir. 1993); Republic of Nicaragua
v. Standard Fruit Co., 937 F.2d 469 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1294 (1992).
51 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
52 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (West 1973 & Supp. 1994); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
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and Influenced Organizations (RICO) Act,5 3 and the 1933 and 1934
Securities Acts,54 as well as charges of illegal age-based employment
discrimination, 55 all can be the subject of compulsory arbitration, so long as
the parties clearly have agreed to arbitrate these disputes. The fact that the
underlying contract was negotiated by parties of unequal bargaining
strength, or not negotiated at all, has not proved to be a significant
obstacle. 56 Since the Court's 1991 decision in Gilmer, both federal and state
courts have held that claims of race and gender discrimination with respect
to employment can also be submitted to arbitration, if the employer and the
employee have agreed to arbitrate them.57
When the focus shifts away from antitrust matters, securities fraud, and
employment discrimination, however, the picture is much less clear. Courts
have in the past two years found claims of unfair trade practice, 58 consumer
borrower disputes with an out-of-state lender, 59 and medical malpractice
claims60 not arbitrable, even in the face of an agreement to arbitrate,
essentially on public policy grounds. 61 In short, the acceptable applications
of commercial arbitration are still being debated.
53 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (West 1984 & Supp. 1994); Shearson/American Express,
Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
54 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-zzz (West 1981 & Supp. 1994); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-III (West 1981
& Supp. 1994); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477
(1989).
55 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
56 As the Court noted in Gilmer, "[m]ere inequality in bargaining power, however, is
not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration agreements are never enforceable in the
employment context. Relationships between securities dealers and investors, for example, may
involve unequal bargaining power, but we nevertheless held in Rodriguez de Quias and
McMahon that agreements to arbitrate in that context are enforceable . . . this claim of
unequal bargaining power is best left for resolution in specific cases." Id. at 33. See also
Allied-Bruce Terminix Co., Inc. v. Dobson, 115 S.Ct. 834, 843 (1995).
57 See Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698 (11th Cir. 1992); Fletcher
v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 619 N.E.2d 998 (N.Y. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 554 (1993);
Williams v. Katten, Muchin, & Zavis, 837 F. Supp. 1430 (N.D. 11. 1993); Hull v. NCR
Corp., 826 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Mo. 1993); Bender v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co.,
789 F. Supp. 155 (D.N.J. 1992).
58 Bill Butler Assoc. v. New England Say. Bank, 611 A.2d 463 (Conn. 1991).
59 Patterson v. lIT Consumer Fin. Corp., 14 Cal. App. 4th 1659 (1993), cert. denied,
114 S.Ct. 1217 (1994).
60 Broemmer v. Abortion Servs. of Phoenix, Ltd., 840 P.2d 1013 (Ariz. 1992).
61 But see North American Van Lines v. Collyer, 616 So. 2d 177 (Fla. App. 1993)
(concluding that a contract between a moving van line company and a consumer required the
arbitration of their dispute). See also Allied-Bruce Terminix Co., Inc. v. Dobson, 115 S.Ct.
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3. Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards
The issue on which the courts are in greatest disagreement is the
exclusivity of the statutory grounds for vacating an arbitral award. A
number of courts insist that awards may be overturned if they violate an
established principle of public policy. 62 Some courts have held that an
award which is in "manifest disregard" of the relevant law must be
vacated. 63 Other courts will vacate an award found to be "arbitrary and
capricious. " 64 In contrast, other courts recognize only the statutory grounds
for vacating awards. Thus, the California Supreme Court has held that an
arbitration award cannot be vacated or corrected for errors of fact or law,
65
or because 'substantial injustice' will result from the award. 66
Of the statutory grounds for review, the claim that the arbitrator(s)
exceeded their powers seems to be invoked particularity often. The
"exceeded authority" standard has application both with regard to the
arbitrator's resolution of the merits of the dispute and arbitral remedy
orders. For example, in Advance Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel
Corporation,67 the California Supreme Court recently held that the remedy
fashioned by an arbitrator does not exceed his or her authority if it "bears a
rational relationship to the underlying contract as interpreted, expressly or
impliedly, by the arbitrator." 68 The Court noted further that the deference
due the arbitrator's decision under the "exceeded authority" standard
"requires a court to refrain from substituting its judgment for the
arbitrator's in determining the contractual scope of those powers."69 The
834 (1995). Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer remarked, "states may regulate contracts,
including arbitration clauses, under general contract law principles and they may invalidate an
arbitration clause 'upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revokation or any
contract.'" Id. at 843 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2). Breyer went on to state, "[w]hat states may not
do is decide that a contract is fair enough to enforce all its basic terms (price, service, credit),
but not fair enough to enforce its arbitration clause. The Act makes any such state policy
unlawful... ."Id.
62 See cases collected at supra note 33.
63 See cases collected at supra note 34.
64 See cases collected at supra note 35.
65 Advance Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corporation, 885 P.2d 994, 1003-05 (Cal.
1994).
66 Moncrash v. Heily & Blase, 883 P.2d 899, 900 (Cal. 1992). See also Marsch
v.Williams, 28 Cal.Rptr. 402 (1994).
67 885 P.2d 994 (Cal. 1994); Mcllroy v. Paine Webber, Inc., 989 F.2d 817 (5th Cir.
1993); Chameleon Dental Prod., Inc. v. Jackson, 925 F.2d 223 (1991).
68 Id. at 996, 1005-06.
69 Id. at 1000.
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standard fashioned by the California Supreme Court is derived in substantial
part from the law of labor arbitration and the rule that a labor arbitration
award which "draws it essence" from the collective bargaining contract is
not subject judicial vacation or modification. 70
An intermediate position of sorts has also emerged on the issue of the
appropriate level of judicial scrutiny to be applied to arbitration awards.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that if the arbitral award is
silent as to rationale, judicial review is to consist of only one inquiry: was
there a "rational basis" for the award?71 The burden rests with the party
challenging the award to refute every possible rational basis for the award. 72
If a rational basis can be established (or even if one possible basis is left
unrefuted), judicial review is limited to the grounds contained in the statute.
On the other hand, if a rationale is given, judicial review is to encompass
both statutory and nonstatutory grounds, including manifest disregard of the
law and public policy. 73
What is the significance of this approach, in light of the prevailing
practice of supplying no written opinion in an arbitral award? Many courts
have noted, at times with apparent irritation, that without a written award,
substantive review is next to impossible. 74 A possible clue to this puzzle
comes from yet another case. In Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. Superior
Court, 75 the court noted that parties to an agreement are free to contract, if
they so desire, for judicial review of the arbitrator's award. The Eleventh
70 In United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960), Mr. Justice Douglas remarked, "[A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and
application of the collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand
of industrial justice. He may of course look for guidance from many sources, yet his award is
legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement." Id.
at 597. Twenty-seven years later, Mr. Justice White restated the standard, citing to Enterprise
Wheel & Car: "As long as the arbitrator's award 'draws its essence from the collective
bargaining agreement,' and is not merely 'his own brand of industrial justice,' the award is
legitimate." United Paperworkers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987).
See generally Feller, supra note 2.
71 Brown v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 994 F.2d 775 (1lth Cir. 1993); see also
Robbins v. Day, 954 F.2d 679 (11th Cir. 1992).
7 2 Brown, 994 F.2d at 779; Robbins, 954 F.2d at 684. The similarity of this approach to
the manner in which courts invoke the business judgment rule is apparent here. See supra note
1.
73 Brown, 994 F.2d at 779.
74 See, e.g., Robbins, 954 F.2d at 684; Azcon Constr. Co. v. Golden Hills Resort, Inc.,
498 N.W.2d 630, 635-36 (S.D. 1993); Feibelman v. F. 0., Inc., 604 A.2d 344, 345 (R.I.
1992); Valentine Sugars, Inc. v. Donau Corp., 981 F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1993).
75 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 295, 303-04 (1993).
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Circuit's rule thus may provide a shorthand way of achieving that result. If
a level of review more rigorous than that of the statutory grounds for
vacating an award is desired (or bargained for) the parties might simply
agree that the arbitrator(s) will provide a written opinion explaining the
award.
4. Other Areas of Disagreement
The power of an arbitrator to award punitive damages continues to
divide the courts. In large part, the disagreement is between the New York
rule, which does not allow the arbitral award of punitive damages, and the
emerging rule under the FAA, which would permit such awards. 76 A
secondary, but important, question is the extent to which the New York rule
should govern in cases brought under the FAA.77 The question of arbitrator
bias is also unsettled. While all agree that bias is not to be allowed, there
remains the problem of the proper test to use: actual bias, or the appearance
of bias. 78
C. Conclusion
The legal framework briefly described above places few restrictions on
the commercial arbitration process. Once the parties have voluntarily agreed
to submit disputes arising under a contractual relationship to arbitration, the
role of the courts is limited to enforcing that agreement and the award that
is its result. It is the closed nature of the commercial arbitration process, the
76 Compare Garrity v. Lyle, Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1976) and Todd
Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056 (9th Cir. 1991). See also Lee v. Chica,
983 F.2d 883 (8th Cir. 1993).
77 See, e.g., Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 948 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1991);
Gouger v. Bear, Steams & Co., Inc., 823 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Todd Shipyards
Corp., 943 F.2d 1056. See generally MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 6, § 36.3.
78 The standard for vacating an arbitral award on the grounds of bias is "evident
partiality," under both the FAA (§ 10(a)(2)) and the UAA (§ 12 (a)(2)). The leading case on
the question of arbitrator bias is Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co.,
393 U.S. 145 (1968), but its teachings have proved difficult to decipher. See the discussion in
Dowd v. First Omaha Sec. Corp., 495 N.W.2d 36, 41 (Neb. 1993). Different interpretations
have emerged from the case law. Some cases insist on proof of specific facts indicating
evident partiality. See, e.g., Peoples See. Life Ins. Co. v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 991
F.2d 141, 146 (4th Cir. 1993); Health Serv. Mgt. Corp. v. Hughes, 975 F.2d 1253, 1264
(7th Cir. 1992). Other cases require proof of facts that instead create a "reasonable impression
of partiality." See, e.g., Pirsig v. Pleasant Mound Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 512 N.W.2d 342
(Minn. App. 1994); Dowd, 495 N.W.2d at 41.
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fact that once they are contractually committed to it the parties effectively
foreclose access to other legal avenues for resolving their disputes, that
raises the ante so substantially. Parties to high-stakes commercial disputes
that agree to "pay their quarter and take their chance" in arbitration, with
no real prospect of correcting an error of procedure or decision that
deprives them of the full benefit of their contractual bargain, are not likely
to remain patient with the process if they perceive it to be an inferior
substitute for litigation.
Thus, the question is presented: is the commercial arbitration process
up to the task of providing commercial disputants with a viable alternative
to traditional litigation? The first step in answering that question is an
examination of the characteristics and the relative attributes and
shortcomings of commercial arbitration as it is practiced today.
IV. CONTEMPORARY COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: THE
PRACTICE DESCRIBED
One of the most striking features of commercial arbitration today is its
largely unstructured and diverse nature. Unlike civil litigation, which is
governed by a body of judicially and legislatively mandated standards
pertaining, inter alia, to hearing procedure, evidence, appeals, and
remedies, commercial arbitration is virtually unregulated. As the preceding
review of the legal framework demonstrates, the Federal Arbitration Act,
the various state adaptations of the Uniform Arbitration Act, and the case
law attendant to those statutes place very few parameters on the commercial
arbitration process or the conduct of commercial arbitrators.
A. General Overview
In most instances the commercial arbitration proceeding is governed by
the rules of the neutral appointing authority (e.g., the American Arbitration
Association (AAA); Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services (JAMS);
Endispute; 79 the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD); the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), etc.) that the disputants select to
adminster the arbitration tribunal and provide panels of neutrals from which
79 On June 1, 1994, JAMS and Endispute announced their merger into a single, as yet
unnamed organization. Until the merger has been fully effectuated and a new set of arbitration
rules promulgated, disputes submitted to either of the predecessor neutral appointing
authorities will continue to be administered under the existing JAMS or Endispute Rules.
Telephone interview with Jeannine Walker, JAMS (June 16, 1994).
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arbitrators are selected. 80 Like the legal framework, the commercial
arbitration rules of those neutral appointing authorities are minimalist in
nature.
Thus, for example, the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules8' constitute
only seventeen single-column pages, while the substantive portion of the
AAA Supplementary Procedures for Large, Complex Disputes 82 is of three
single-column pages. 83 Only a small number of those rules pertain to
hearing conduct, and they are very general in nature. The AAA Rules say
little about standards for decision or the substantive form or content of the
award. The by-words for the pre-hearing and hearing procedures under the
AAA Rules are informality, expediency, and cost savings. 84
80 Of course, the parties are free to devise their own mutually acceptable rules for the
arbitration proceeding, select an arbitrator without the assistance of a neutral appointing
authority, or both.
81 A.A.A. COMMERCIAL ARBrrRATION RULES (1993). Over the years, the American
Arbitration Association has been the most well-known of the neutral appointing authorities.
Accordingly, its Commercial Arbitration Rules and Supplementary Procedures for Large,
Complex Disputes provide a useful conceptualization of the procedural paradigm for
contemporary commercial arbitration. Most prominent among the other neutral appointing
authorities are the recently merged Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services (JAMS) and
Endispute. As noted above, at the time of this writing, the new, as of yet unnamed, entity had
not promulgated the rules for the arbitrations that will be conducted under its auspicies.
Accordingly, the comments inserted at various points in the text below as to the alternative
approaches to the AAA Rules indicated by the JAMS and Endispute Rules will be based on
the exisiting separate rules of those two predecessor organizations.
82 A.A.A. SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES (1993).
83 The JAMS Arbitration Rules are four single-spaced pages in length. (on file with The
Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution). The composite (Streamlined Arbitration Rules and
Comprehensive Arbitration Rules) Endispute Rules are sixteen single-spaced pages in length.
(on file with The Ohio State Journal on Dispute Journal).
84 Consistent with this approach, neither AAA, JAMS, nor Endispute maintain, in a
readily accessible format, the data necessary to gain a fuller picture of the nature of
contemporary commercial arbitration. For example, in conducting the initial research for this
article, the Authors requested but were unable to obtain information characterizing the typical
commercial arbitration proceeding conducted under the auspicies of the AAA, JAMS or
Endispute (e.g., the average number of hearing days, the average amount in controversy, the
average adminstrative fee charged, the average total charge for arbitrator compensation and
expenses, or the average time from filing of the claim in arbitration to issuance of the award).
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Pursuant to the AAA Rules neither the federal nor state rules of civil
procedure, nor the rules of evidence apply. 85 Although the practice appears
to be subject to exception, AAA arbitrators generally are not compensated
for the first hearing day. 86 To further limit costs, standard AAA practice
limits arbitrator study time to one day for every five hearing days. Per diem
rates charged by the arbitrators on the AAA Commercial Arbitration Panel
generally range from $400 to $1,000.
Under AAA auspices substantive written awards providing insight as to
the arbitrator's analysis and mode of decision are the exception. In addition,
due to the dispersion of the caseload among a large number of neutrals, and
because of the general absence of written awards, there is no reliable
mechanism for evaluating the competency and acceptability of commercial
arbitrators.
There is nothing necessarily inappropriate about the present open-ended
character of the rules and procedures governing commercial arbitration.
What is clear, however, is that the exceedingly wide range of discretion
afforded commercial arbitrators with regard to hearing conduct and related
matters, as well as the form and content of the arbitration award in tandem,
results in a wide variation in the current practice of commercial arbitration.
To a great extent the tenor and nature of the arbitration proceeding, as well
as the fairness and defensibility of the outcomes it produces, depend on the
arbitrator and the skills, knowledge, and mindset he or she brings to the
table. 87 Given that fact, the examination of contemporary commercial
arbitration set forth below will begin with a description of the arbitrators
and the current state of the commercial arbitration profession.
B. The Arbitrators
The several neutral appointing authorities do not currently maintain
demographic data on the members of their panels in accessible form. 88 For
85 A.A.A. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION Rule 31 speaks to the admissibility of evidence.
It provides in relevant part: "The arbitrator shall be the judge of the relevance and materiality
of the evidence offered, and conformity to legal rules of evidence shall not be necessary."
86 A.A.A. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION Rule 50 (1993).
87 See Securities Arbitration, supra note 12, at 55-59 (1992).
88 The Authors requested several categories of information from AAA, JAMS, and
Endispute regarding the demographic characteristics of the individuals listed on their
respective commercial arbitration panels. All of the data requested was reported to be
unretrieveable, either on a total panel basis or through random samples of the respective
panels. The following types of information were sought:
o the age distribution of the panel members;
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that reason and because the information is not available from reliable
secondary sources, precise description of the existing corps of commercial
arbitrators is impossible. Instead, this discussion of the characteristics of the
circa 1994 commercial arbitrator and the current state of the commercial
arbitration profession will, by necessity, be couched in general, somewhat
speculative terms.
Unlike the field of labor arbitration, which has in the last forty-five
years become an important dimension of the national labor policy under the
Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947,89 there is no core group of
career neutrals that can be identified as constituting the commercial
arbitration profession. 90 In large part, commercial arbitration appears to be
" race, gender, ethnic makeup of the panel members;
" the percentage of panel members who are attorneys;
" the percentage of panel members with prior litigation experience;
" professions from which the nonlawyer panel members are drawn (e.g.,
engineering, business, etc.);
" average number of years of post-secondary education;
" number of panel members retired or still working full time;
" percentage of working time commited to arbitration (as a neutral
and/or as an advocate);
" average (panel-wide) total number of selections (as arbitrator);
" average (panel-wide) number of selections per year;
" number of panel members who have never been selected;
" average (panel-wide) total awards (cases decided);
" average (panel-wide) number of awards per year,
" number of panel members who have never decided a case;
" ranges of per diem/hourly rate charges.
Interestingly, The General Accounting Office of the U.S. Congress (GAO) reported
similar problems in obtaining arbitrator demographic information in conducting its recent
study of the arbitration of discrimination claims brought by employees of the securities
industry under the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD) arbitration mechanisms. See Employment Discrimination, supra
note 12, at 8-9, 23. The GAO reported that NASD claimed to have no information on the
demographic makeup of its arbitation panel. The sole source of demographic data on the
members of the NYSE arbitration panel proved to be the recollections of the senior staff
attorney in the NYSE Arbitration Department. Id. at 23.
89 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144 (1988).
9 0 That core group of mainstream arbitrators in the union-employer, collective
bargaining sphere consists in large part of the 600 or so active members of the National
Academy of Arbitrators. Labor arbitrators are elected to membership in the National Academy
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a process overseen by individuals who view the work as an avocation, a
collateral dimension of their careers. There are very few, if any, full-time
commercial arbitrators, in the prime of their professional careers. 91 Instead,
the overwhelming majority of commercial cases are arbitrated either by
attorneys, college professors, or similarly situated professionals engaged in
other full-time occupations, or by former judges, lawyers, and other
professionals who are in their retirement years. Despite the dearth of
concrete demographic data, the fact that most commercial arbitrators are
drawn from the ranks of senior or retired members of the judiciary, the
practicing bar, and other professions leaves little doubt that the
overwhelming number of practicing commercial arbitrators are white males
over the age of 50.92
Other than securing placement on the panel(s) of one or more of the
neutral appointing authorities or being selected to serve by the parties to
arbitration or both, there is no clear career path for those who aspire to be
commercial arbitrators. The qualificational standards currently in place, as
applied by the several neutral appointing authorities, do not constitute any
real credentialing process. 93 Beyond the rudimentary orientation programs
of a few days or a week in length provided by the neutral appointing
authorities, there is no accepted training or apprenticeship regimen for
aspiring commercial arbitrators. There is no professional organization of
any real substance, organized by and for commercial arbitrators, that
of Arbitrators based primarily on their demonstrated, long-run acceptability among labor and
management advocates who submit cases to arbitration.
91 In February of 1994, AAA reported there were no full-time arbitrators on its
commercial panel. Letter from Frank Zotto, A.A.A. Associate Vice President, Case
Administration, to Stephen L. Hayford (Feb. 1, 1994) (on file with The Ohio State Journal on
Dispute Journal).
92 See Dorissa Bolinski & David Singer, Why Are So Few Women in the ADR Field?,
ARB. J., Sept. 1993, at 61-65; Employment Discrimination, supra note 12, at 8.
93 In his 1988 article describing commercial arbitration under the American Arbitration
Association rules, Professor Stipanowich noted, "Unfortunately, AAA panelists vary
considerably in experience and ability. It is possible that an individual whose name appears on
the AAA panel was appointed to the list on his or her own motion without training or
experience with arbitration." Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 447-48. Later observers have
echoed this criticism. See, e.g., Stephen A. Hochman, A Bar Association-Sponsored Forum
for Arbitration is Needed, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 22, 1992, at 1. Hochman notes that "over 95% of
those who apply to be approved as AAA arbitrators are accepted." See also Brunet, supra
note 11, at 88 (questioning the subject matter expertise of many, if not most, commercial
arbitrators). The single apparent exception is the existing JAMS requirement that the
arbitrators who serve under its auspicies be former members of the state or federal judiciaries.
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provides an identity group, a code of professional responsibility, or a
systematic program of professional development for commercial arbitrators.
The fragmented nature of the commercial arbitration profession and the
lack of a clear professional identity and shared perspective among those
professing to be commercial arbitrators gives rise to tangible questions as to
the current process whereby aspiring commercial arbitrators are credentialed
and secure placement on the panels maintained by the various neutral
appointing authorities. Additional reason for serious concern is found in the
lack of a mechanism for verifying the background information provided by
prospective arbitrators, the absence of any truly effective means for
evaluating the hearing conduct, substantive knowledge and analytical
abilities of practicing commercial arbitrators, and the lack of any effective
method for providing feedback in that regard to the advocates who make
arbitrator selection decisions. 94
Today, at least in general terms, there is considerable reason to
question whether the majority of the individuals constituting the pool from
which commercial arbitrators are selected possess levels of subject matter
knowledge and adjudicatory skills comparable to those provided by the
sitting judges whose place they take. That concern and those attendant to the
largely ad hoc nature of the arbitrator development process and the wide
range of qualifications and abilities reflected in the current pool of
commercial arbitrators will be addressed at length in the latter portion of
this analysis.
C. The Components of the Arbitral Proceeding
The discussion will now turn to a chronological description and critique
of the contemporary commercial arbitration proceeding, set in juxtaposition
where appropriate, with a description of the parallel dimensions of
traditional litigation in court.
1. Pleadings and Pre-Hearing Motions
The first major distinguishing characteristic of the commercial
arbitration process is the comparative simplicity and brevity of the pleadings
and pre-hearing stage. In contrast to arbitration, the litigants in civil law-
suits quickly discover there is a long road to be traversed between filing the
94 See Securities Arbitration, supra note 12, at 55-59. See also Brunet, supra note 11, at
88. In March 1994, the General Accounting Office (GAO) issued a report on arbitration of
employment disputes in the securities industry. The study was critical of the procedures used
by the New York Stock Exchange and the National Association of Securities Dealers to select
and appoint arbitrators for such disputes. See Employment Discrimination, supra note 12.
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complaint and having one's day in court. More often than not, there is a
barrage of preliminary motions whereby each side compels the other to
sharpen, narrow, and consolidate its legal claims and allegations of fact
within the confines of existing law. This process is governed generally by
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 7-15 95 (and their state analogs).
Resolution of each of these threshold points of contention requires a
motion, a response, and a hearing before the trial judge (or a designee).
Following this preliminary jousting, the pre-trial practice in traditional
litigation typically moves to a motion(s) to dismiss. This motion, sanctioned
by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), 96 precedes discovery and
serves to test the legal sufficiency of the claims brought by the parties
against one another. It ensures that only claims for relief sanctioned by law
are advanced to adjudication. The final major pre-trial motion is the motion
for summary judgment. This motion, seeking partial or full adjudication of
the claims at issue without trial, is sanctioned by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 5697 and is a common feature in many civil lawsuits. It is
warranted when, at the conclusion of the pre-trial discovery process, there
remain no unresolved questions of material fact. In that circumstance, the
trial judge acting on the motion for summary judgment applies the relevant
law to the undisputed material facts and thereby adjudicates the dispute
without trial.
Pre-trial motion practice can result in a number of preliminary
skirmishes of questionable value that lengthen the civil litigation process
unnecessarily. Nevertheless, at the same time, pre-trial motions do sharpen
the inquiry at trial by limiting it only to claims with a clear basis in the law
that center on disputed material facts. In addition, operation of the notice
pleading mechanism results in the litigants, counsel, and the trial judge
entering the trial phase fully informed as to the essential nature of the legal
claims and factual allegations at issue.
In a manner analogous to traditional litigation, the commercial
arbitration proceeding commences with the filing of the moving party's
(claimant's) demand for arbitration, setting forth a concise description of
the facts pertinent to the underlying dispute and a description of the relief
the claimant seeks. 98 Subsequently, the respondent in arbitration files an
answer to the claimant's submission, taking issue with any disputed factual
allegations, setting forth any defenses, and articulating any counterclaims
against the claimant that may arise from the subject controversy. This
95 FED. R. Civ. P. 7-15.
96 FaD. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
9 7 FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
98 See A.A.A. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION Rule 6(a); see also ENDISPUTE
COMPARATIVE ARBITRATION Rule C-1.
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pleadings process is largely mechanical and does not require any active
intervention by the arbitrator. In fact, the pleadings process is usually
complete before the arbitrator is selected.
There is no formal analog in commercial arbitration to the pre-trial
motion practice in traditional litigation. This characteristic of the process
accounts for a substantial portion of the cost and time savings that can be
realized in arbitration. Rule 10 of the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules
does provide for pre-hearing proceedings, including a "preliminary
hearing" However, Rule 10 does not expressly contemplate pre-hearing
motions addressing the form and content of the pleadings, questions of
proper parties and jurisdiction, or attempts to avoid a hearing by achieving
dismissal as a matter of law or through an adjudication based on undisputed
facts. 
99
Rule 4 of the AAA Supplementary Procedures for Large, Complex
Disputes does speak to a more extensive preliminary hearing dealing with,
among other matters: service by the parties on one another of detailed
statements of claims, damages, and defenses; specification of the issues
before the arbitrator; and stipulations of fact. Even though this proceeding
is labeled a "preliminary hearing," on its face, Rule 4 does not contemplate
any form of adjudication by the neutral in the nature of a motion to dismiss
or a motion for summary judgment. In the same manner, the emphasis of
the relevant pre-hearing portion of the Endispute Comprehensive
Arbitration Rules is on the submission of claim, answer, and counterclaim.
100
The omission of a surrogate for pre-hearing motion practice from the
existing framework for commercial arbitration does not mean the concerns
underlying that dimension of traditional litigation are not at times present in
commercial arbitration. Rather, the Authors believe this circumstance is due
to the fact that, to date, the parties and their attorneys generally have been
willing to forego pre-hearing motion practice and present their entire cases
at hearing. This is likely to continue to be the case in the commercial
disputes submitted to arbitration that present relatively simple questions of
law (and contract) and application of law to fact.
99 The sole pre-hearing adjudication frequently requested in commercial arbitration is in
the form of a claim that all or a portion of the matter in dispute is procedurally or
substantively inarbitrable. Typically, such claims submitted to the arbitrator are deferred for
decision until the issuance of the award.
100 JAMS Rule S.C grants the arbitrator authority to establish an informal procedure to
"rule on dispositive motions." JAMS confirms this Rule empowers the arbitrator to hear and
decide motions analogous to the motion to dismiss and the motion for summary judgment.
Telephone interview with Jeannine Walker, JAMS (July 6, 1994).
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However, as larger numbers of more complex cases are submitted to
arbitration, arbitrators will find themselves frequently confronted with the
type of complicated questions of law and application of law to fact that give
rise to the pre-trial motions in traditional litigation. These cases seldom turn
on simple questions of contract interpretation. Rather, they typically involve
numerous and interrelated claims based in common law doctrine or statutory
law, or both. Consequently, questions of law and mixed questions of law
and fact are often crucial determinations that competent adjudication
requires to be made in some fashion, tacitly or expressly, by the arbitration
tribunal.
Motions to sharpen the pleadings and to more clearly define the issues
to be arbitrated and/or to ascertain the proper parties to an arbitration are
not particularly problematical. If nothing else, the parties can alert the
arbitrator to these matters, and even argue them before the arbitrator at a
preliminary hearing, the arbitrator deciding them at that point or, if
feasible, reserving judgment until the post-hearing deliberation stage. 101 In
contrast, a strong argument can be made that in light of the emphasis placed
on simplicity, expediency, and expense reduction, motions to dismiss and
summary judgment motions are inappropriate in arbitration. The questions
of law and application of law to facts underlying those two motions are fair
game for argument at the closing of the proceeding, with decision .being
reserved until the award stage.
Balanced against this assertion is the claim that in arbitration, like
litigation, critical threshold questions of law should be resolved definitively
and on the record. Surely, doubt in the minds of the parties and their
attorneys as to whether the arbitrator understood, and adequately dealt with,
the questions of law and application of law to facts underlying the motion to
dismiss and the motion for summary judgment would not bode well for the
long-run viability and acceptability of commercial arbitration as an adequate
substitute for traditional litigation. It is the Authors' belief that dialogue is
called for here to ascertain the value of permitting the parties to submit
these claims to arbitrators in some fashion, at some point in the
proceedings, and to ensure that they are adequately addressed.
2. The Role and Nature of Discovery
As with most all of the dimensions of commercial arbitration, it is
difficult to generalize as to the extent and nature of pre-hearing discovery.
101 The Authors' arbitral experience provides anecdotal evidence for the assertion that
these two types of motions are occasionally advanced and decided in complex commercial
arbitration cases today.
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The only reference to pre-hearing discovery contained in the AAA
Commercial Arbitration Rules is found at Rule 10 which addresses the
Preliminary Conference. Rule 10 authorizes the arbitrator to "establish...
the extent of and schedule for the production of relevant documents and
other information, [and to establish] the identification of any witnesses to be
called." Rule 5(b)-(d) of the Association's Supplementary Procedures for
Large, Complex Cases grants the arbitrator(s) authority to: direct an
exchange of documents, exhibits, and information; limit the nature and
extent of discovery; and order the deposition of, or the propounding of
written interrogatories to a person possessing material knowledge if that
person will not be available to testify at the arbitration hearing. In addition
to these matters, Endispute's Comprehensive Arbitration Rule C-13 speaks
directly to interrogatories, 102 document exchange, 103 expert witnesses, 104
and the parties' continuing obligation to provide one another with
documents they rely upon to supplement their post-pleading responses. 10 5
The discovery-related promulgations cited above contemplate a pre-
hearing discovery process that focuses on the production of documents and
data. Depositions and written interrogatories are accorded a lower level of
significance, generally being deemed warranted only if the deponent or the
subject of the interrogatories is not able to testify at the hearing, or if the
party seeking to depose a hostile witness can convince the arbitrator of a
reasonable need for the deposition(s).
This is a substantial departure from traditional litigation where one
typically proceeds to trial having fully previewed and tested the testimony
of the witnesses who will be called by the opposing party. Of course, by
placing the testimony of potential witnesses on the record at an early date
depositions also serve as a valuable honesty check on those who are actually
called to testify. On the other hand, because such a large portion of the
10 2 ENDISPUTE COMPARATVE ARBITRATION Rule C-13.2. This rule provides for ten
interrogatories (without subparts) by the Responding Party within ten days of the service of
the Response to Claims (the Answer) or the Response to Counterclaims.
103 ENDISPUTE COMPARATIVE ARBITRATION Rule C-13.3. This rule, entitled "Document
Exchange," states: "Within seven (7) days after the service of the Response to Claims or
Response to Counterclaims, the Parties will provide each other copies of all documents in
their possession or control on which they will then rely in support of their positions."
104 ENDsPUTE COMPARATIVE ARBITRATION Rule C-13.4. This rule, entitled "Experts"
states: "Within seven (7) days after the service of the Response to Claims or Response to
Counterclaims, the parties will provide to each other the names and addresses of experts who
may be called upon to testify or whose report may be introduced at the Arbitration hearing."
105 ENDISPUTE COMPARATIVE ARBITRATION Rule C-13.7. This rule further precludes the
introduction at the arbitration hearing of documents not previously provided to the opposing
party, unless the parties mutually agree.
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expense and delay of traditional litigation is the result of the deposition
process, the limitations contemplated by the above-discussed AAA and
Endispute Rules are understandable. Whether the litigators who now find
themselves presenting cases in arbitration will, over time, conclude that the
lack of comprehensive pre-hearing depositions is a significant handicap or
an acceptable tradeoff for more expeditious, less expensive adjudication
remains to be seen.
Because of the very obtuse nature of the discovery-related rules in
commercial arbitration, the arbitrator is left in virtual complete control of
the process, with little guidance other than general admonitions like that
appearing in Rule 5(b) of the AAA Supplementary Procedures for Large,
Complex Disputes that rulings are to be "consistent with the goal of
achieving a just, speedy and cost-effective resolution" of the matter in
controversy. 106 Undoubtedly, many arbitrators with substantial litigation
experience are comfortable turning to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26-
37 as a defacto basis for discovery-related rulings, particularly in complex
cases.
Nevertheless, in light of the lack of concrete guides to arbitral action in
the formal rules governing commercial arbitration, a key concern must be
the degree of consistency in discovery-related matters across proceedings
and among arbitrators. Wide disparity in the amounts and types of
discovery permitted would be a cause for substantial concern. Because of
the dearth of hard, reported data as to the extent and nature of discovery
being permitted in commercial cases and the satisfaction of advocates with
the current practice in that regard, both dialogue and empirical research are
called for here. All of this inquiry must center on ascertaining the point of
optimal tradeoff (diminishing marginal returns) between the expense and
delay in adjudication that can result from excessive or vexatious discovery
and the advantages of proceeding to hearing with the full knowledge of the
factual underpinnings of the opponent's case and the objective assessment of
the relative strength of one's own case that adequate discovery can help
produce.
3. The Pre-Hearing Conference
Although it is difficult to determine the frequency with which
substantive pre-hearing conferences are conducted in commercial arbitration
cases, it does appear that such conferences are not uncommon. 10 7 The
matters typically dealt with in the pre-hearing conference are largely
ministerial in nature.
106 A.A.A. SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURE Rule 5(b) (1993).
107 See, e.g., Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 463.
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Rule 10 of the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules speaks to pre-
hearing proceedings ("Administrative Conference, Preliminary Hearing,
and Mediation Conference") and contemplates that they will address matters
like specification of the issues to be decided, stipulations of fact,
identification of witnesses, and resolution of document production matters.
Rule 10 contemplates that the pre-hearing administrative conference will be
conducted by an AAA official, typically the administrator assigned to the
particular case. Rule 10 and Rule 4 of the Supplementary Procedures for
Large, Complex Disputes further provide for a preliminary hearing
conducted by the arbitrator which deals, inter alia, with case management
matters pertaining to discovery, fact stipulations, citation of legal
authorities, marking and exchange of exhibits. 108
The above-described nature of the typical pre-hearing proceeding in
commercial arbitration fails adequately to contemplate two important
purposes served by the pre-trial conference in traditional litigation. First,
the pre-trial conference enables the judge who will preside at trial to assess
whether, and to ensure that, the parties and their attorneys are prepared to
proceed, the issues are squarely joined, and the rules of engagement at trial
are understood. This provides layperson litigants with a valuable orientation
as to the nature, rigor, and extent of the fact-finding process they will face
at trial. In addition, the judge can use the pre-trial conference as a vehicle
for addressing in a preemptive fashion many matters pertaining to the
admissibility of evidence, authenticity of documents, remaining discovery-
related disputes, and the like. By skillfully managing the pre-trial
conference, the presiding judge can do much to minimize surprise and
logistical problems at trial.
Second, the pre-trial conference also allows the judge who is so
inclined to encourage the parties, often in a forceful manner, to explore all
possible avenues of settlement, short of trial. The "mediation" that
frequently transpires at the pre-hearing conference can give the parties and
counsel a sense of the judge's early evaluation of the relative merits of their
respective cases and a preview of what they can expect from the bench if
trial commences. This final opportunity at settlement, glossed by the reality
and uncertainty of impending trial, occurs at a time and within a context
that are optimally conducive to settlement. Handled adroitly by a judge who
is also an effective mediator, this last-chance settlement opportunity is a
most valuable aspect of the traditional litigation model.
Both of these elements of the pre-trial conference in traditional
litigation are missing in most contemporary commercial arbitration
proceedings. The pre-hearing conference is typically handled by a case
administrator or case manager who is not an arbitrator and who will have no
108 See ENDISPUTE CoMPARATIvE ARBITRATION Rule C-6.
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involvement in the substantive dimensions of the case. Thus, the
involvement of that administrative official in the pre-hearing conference
does little to ensure an orderly and effective start to the actual arbitration
hearing. Further, there is no guarantee that the manner in which disputed
issues are resolved at the pre-hearing conference by the case administrator
or case manager employed by the neutral appointing authority will set the
rule at hearing.
Important as this first group of concerns may be, the Authors assert that
the lost opportunity for a meaningful, forceful mediation effort represents a
much more substantial omission. AAA Commercial Arbitration Rule 10
does advise the parties that, with their consent, AAA will facilitate a
mediation effort by a person other than the arbitrator. Rule 2(c) of the AAA
Supplementary Procedures for Large, Complex Disputes states that during
the Administrative Conference, held between the parties and the AAA
official administering the tribunal prior to selection of the arbitrator,
mediation and other forms of non-adjudicative dispute resolution methods
will be considered. 109 In addition, Rule 4 (g) provides that "the possibility
of mediation or other non-adjudicative methods of dispute resolution" may
be discussed at the preliminary hearing conducted by the arbitrator. 110
There is no generally available empirical evidence to indicate how often
and to what degree of effectiveness this dimension of the AAA Rules is
implemented. Given the widely-reported success of the experiments with
court-directed mediation in the several states,111 there can be little doubt
that a pre-hearing effort at mediation is well-advised in the majority of
commercial arbitration cases. The Authors assert the absence of a
mechanism for making mediation a pro forma part of the process of
commercial arbitration, a precursor to the formal, adversarial arbitration
proceeding, is a serious void in the current mechanism.
The key to ameliorating this omission would be convincing the parties
of the utility and the cost effectiveness of a pre-hearing mediation effort. In
traditional litigation, the trial judge who is inclined to mediate can easily
propel the parties to do so within the context of the pre-trial conference. In
arbitration, this is a more difficult task. Currently, in that alternative forum,
109 A.A.A. SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES Rule 2(c) (1993).
11 0 A.A.A. SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES Rule 4(g) (1993).
111 Several states have experimented with or have adopted the use of court-ordered
mediated settlement conferences. Studies of such programs have been generally favorable.
Florida has the most widely known program. For a discussion of the Florida program, see
James J. Alfini, Trashing, Bashing, and Hashing It Out: Is This the E,.d of "Good
Mediation"?, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 47 (1991); KARL D. ScHULTz, FLORIDA'S
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION DEMONSTRATION PROJECT: AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT
(Florida Dispute Resolution Center, Tallahassee, Florida 1990).
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there is no effective substitute for the forceful championing of mediation
that can be provided by the trial judge (or the mandate of mediation in some
jurisdictions found in legislation or judicial rule). This void must be filled.
Dialogue is called for on the question of whether and how in
commercial arbitration an effective means can be developed for entreating
the parties to enter into a meaningful mediation effort prior to proceeding to
the arbitration hearing. The dialogue also should center on the parallel
concerns of the timing of the inquiry as to mediation and the propriety of
the arbitrator serving as the mediator.1 12
4. Hearing Advocacy Tactics and The Rules of Evidence
One of the primary selling points for the commercial arbitration
alternative to traditional litigation is its relative simplicity of procedure and
substance. At hearing, this characteristic is reflected by the absence of rigid
standards for the admission of evidence. Rule 31 of the AAA Commercial
Arbitration Rules states that "conformity to legal rules of evidence shall not
be necessary."113 Instead, the arbitrator is instructed to judge the relevance
and materiality of the proffered evidence. Rule 31 does not expressly
establish relevance or materiality as criteria for the admissibility of
evidence.
Two somewhat contrasting approaches are indicated by the evidence-
related rules of JAMS and Endispute. JAMS Rule 6.E. "Presentation of
Evidence" states in relevant part:
Judicial rules relating to . . . admissibility of evidence will not
be applicable in this proceeding. Any relevant evidence,
including hearsay, shall be admitted by the arbitrator if it is the
sort of evidence upon which responsible persons are accustomed
to rely in the conduct of serious affairs, regardless of the
admissibility of such evidence in a court of law. 114
Endispute's Comprehensive Arbitration Rule C-17.2 "Evidence" provides
in relevant part:
The Arbitrator will consider evidence that the Arbitrator finds is
relevant and material to the dispute, giving the evidence such
weight as the Arbitrator determines is appropriate. The
112 The advisability of arbitrators serving as mediators is discussed in a subsequent
portion of this analysis.
113 A.A.A. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION Rule 31 (1993).
114 JAMS ARBITRATION RutLs, PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 6.E.
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Arbitrator may be guided in that determination by judicial rules
of evidence; however, conformity to the judicial rules of
evidence is not required, except that the Arbitrator shall apply
the law relating to privileges and work product.
115
J
Despite the fluid nature of the evidentiary standards in commercial
arbitration, the Authors' collective experience indicates that litigators are
seldom able or willing to abandon the standard jury trial modus operandi,
including the compulsion to continually test the boundaries of the rules of
evidence applicable in court while strenuously challenging the same
maneuvers by opposing counsel. Generally, admonitions from the arbitrator
to counsel to remember that rigid adherence to the rules of evidence is not
necessary (because the case is not being presented to a jury of laypersons)
go unheeded. At times this adherence to traditional jury trial tactics can
result in a highly dysfunctional and unnecessary extension of the
proceeding, and a significant diminution in arbitral attention span. It also
leads to the application of a wide range of defacto evidentiary standards at
hearing, depending in large part on the proclivities and the decisional
consistency of the presiding arbitrator.
The roadblocks to expeditious adjudication and the inconsistency in de
facto evidentiary standards that frequently arise at hearings are troubling
and indicate a need for a careful scrutiny of this key dimension of the
commercial arbitration process. Litigators, arbitrators, and neutral
appointing authorities are obliged to confront this reality and openly and
thoughtfully debate the utility of the current rudimentary evidentiary
standards. If a consensus emerges in favor of a simplified evidentiary
standard, it needs to be more clearly defined and attorneys and arbitrators
alike must deem themselves obliged to abide by it. If the result is general
agreement that something more than the existing evidentiary framework is
called for, new standards need to be drafted that fully contemplate the
presence of an expert adjudicator who need not be shielded in the same
manner as a lay jury.
D. The Dual Roles of the Arbitrator and the Arbitral Decision-
Making Process
In commercial arbitration there is no separation of the roles of identifier
of the law and finder of fact/applier of law to fact. Like the judge in a bench
trial, the arbitrator mutually selected by the parties serves both functions.
Unlike a jury or bench trial, the decision process of the adjudicator in a
commercial arbitration case, including formulation of an appropriate
115 ENDISPUTE COMPARATIVE ARBITRATION Rule C-17.2.
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remedy, is not segmented in any way, is almost always completely off the
record, produces a result that is unaffected by precedent, and is not subject
to review or appeal. As with the several other dimensions of the commercial
arbitration process noted previously, in this scenario the fairness of the
procedure and the accuracy and correctness of the outcome is left entirely to
the arbitrator to ensure.
Juxtaposition of this characteristic of commercial arbitration with the
multiple on-the-record decision points and devices intended to ensure
accurate and correct decision making present in conventional litigation
makes for a stark contrast. Thus, in commercial arbitration there typically
are no on-the-record rulings on pre-hearing motions to dismiss, motions for
summary judgment, or jury instructions that oblige the arbitrator to reveal
the law (or contract language) and interpretation thereof, or the facts as the
arbitrator believes them to be. At the same time there are no devices, like
the motion for judgment as a matter of law, that provide an opportunity for
the parties to challenge the factual determinations of the arbitrator or the
arbitrator's application of the relevant law or contract language to the facts.
The shroud enveloping the decision process of the commercial arbitrator is
completed by the dominant practice disfavoring any form of substantive
analysis-findings of fact or interpretation/application of law-in the written
arbitration award.
This state of affairs creates an irony that seems lost on many of those
who advocate the minimalist, no-substantive-written-analysis model of
commercial arbitration. If one accepts the premise that parties and the
attorneys who represent them are concerned that their cases be resolved
based on a correct identification of the controlling law, accurate findings of
facts, and a proper application of that law to the facts, the inability to
discover how the arbitrator decided these matters presents reason for pause
and a clear focal point for further discourse.
As observed earlier, the Authors are convinced that neither commercial
arbitration nor the parties would be well served by introduction of a
complex web of pre-hearing and post-hearing motion practice. Nevertheless,
a substantial question remains as to whether litigants and litigators, who
have a choice between the civil litigation process, replete with its full array
of procedural and substantive due process protections, on-the-record
decision making (at least with regard to questions of law), and checks on
accuracy, will continue to be willing to contractually commit themselves to
an alternate procedure that provides none of the same.
This is an issue that requires serious, thoughtful examination. The
Authors submit that the debate must address the utility of written awards
wherein the arbitrator reveals, at least in summary form, the law identified
as controlling, the key findings of fact, and the manner in which the
relevant law was applied to the facts. The focal point for dialogue is
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whether, over the long run, parties and the attorneys who represent them
will be willing to utilize an alternative adjudicatory system that provides no
insight as to the manner in which such critical issues have been resolved in
the course of reaching the final adjudicative decision. A parallel
consideration for discussion is what significance, if any, the parties and
counsel attach to being denied an important means (the written award) for
evaluation of the arbitrator's knowledge of the relevant substantive law and
ability to apply that law to the facts.
E. Post-Award Appeals for Vacation or Modification
Because it has been addressed in the preceding analysis of the relevant
law, the relative immunity of commercial arbitration awards from judicial
vacation or modification on the merits need not be dwelt on here. Pursuant
to the widely-accepted majority rule, with the exception of the very narrow
grounds set forth in the Federal Arbitration Act and its state analogs (none
of which go to the merits of the arbitrator's award in resolution of the
dispute) the parties to a commercial arbitration proceeding are generally
stuck with the result it produces.
The only guarantees of procedural fairness are the rudimentary
standards of Section 10 (a)-(c) of the FAA which provide relief from only
the most blatant and obvious transgressions by the arbitrator resulting in
prejudice to the rights of a party. As to the merits of a dispute submitted to
arbitration, the sanctity of the arbitration award leaves the parties with no
avenue for challenging the correctness of the arbitrator's interpretation and
application of the relevant contract language and the applicable law. Thus,
in arbitration the doctrines of stare decisis and res judicata cannot be
enforced. In addition, there is no means for ensuring that the award is based
on an accurate reading of the facts at issue.
This circumstance stands in stark contrast to the multiple checks built
into the traditional litigation model that serve to minimize the possibility of
a misidentification of the relevant law by the trial judge or a nullification or
serious misapplication of the relevant law by the jury, or both. Assurance
that the trial judge will correctly identify the controlling law is provided by
the right to appeal any rulings on motions to dismiss, motions for summary
judgment, and the like, as well as instructions to the jury that the appellant
believes reflect an improper reading of the controlling law.
In addition, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide the trial judge
with certain devices for over-riding the jury in its task of finding the
material facts and applying the controlling law to those facts. Thus, a party
can move for a judgment as a matter of law, as contemplated by Federal
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Rule 50(a)116 at the close of all the evidence (traditionally referred to as a
motion for a directed verdict). If such a motion has been made and denied,
the party can renew the motion for judgment as a matter of law after an
adverse verdict is returned by the jury117 (traditionally referred to as a
motion for judgment not withstanding the verdict (JNOV)). In either case,
the standard for judgment as a matter of law is the same. 118 Judgment as a
matter of law is warranted if the trial judge, after considering the evidence
supporting the non-movant's case and after drawing all reasonable
inferences from the evidence in the non-movant's favor, concludes that a
reasonable jury could not find for the non-movant. 119
The probability of a successful effort to take the case away from the
jury by the judgment as a matter of law device is not high. Nevertheless, it
provides an important fail-safe mechanism whereby the trial judge can
guarantee the integrity of the jury's process of fact finding and application
of law to facts, and thereby further ensure an accurate and correct result.
If a party believes that the trial proceeding itself is so rife with serious
errors of procedure or substance, attorney, party, or juror misconduct, or
other occurrences so prejudicial to its case as to render the trial unjust, it
may enter a motion for a new trial. This motion is sanctioned by Federal
Rule 59(a)-(c). 120 It is granted only in particularly extraordinary situations.
Nevertheless, the motion for a new trial does provide litigants with one
final, catch-all basis for seeking a re-adjudication of their case if they
believe they have been denied a fair adjudication.
The final post-verdict motions available to the parties in traditional
litigation permit challenges to the magnitude of the jury's award of
damages. Thus, defendants facing what they believe to be an excessive
compensatory and/or punitive damages award can petition the court for
remittitur seeking a reduction in that award, typically within the context of
a motion for a new trial. 121 In an analogous manner, in the state courts, a
plaintiff that has prevailed at trial but nevertheless contends the jury's award
of damages is inordinately low may petition the court for addititur seeking
an enhancement of the remedy directed by the jury. 12 2
1 16 FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a).
1 17 FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b).
118 FLEMING JAMES ETAL., CIVILPROCEDURE § 7.30 n.16 (4th ed. 1992).
119 Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943). See also JAMES ET AL., supra note
118, § 7.30 nn.20-21.
12 0 FED. R. Civ. P. 59(a)-(c).
121 See JAMES Er AL., supra note 118, § 7.29.
122 See id. The use of addititur in the federal courts has been deemed to abridge the
Sev ruth Amendment and is therefore proscribed. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935).
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The devices discussed above furnish the parties in the traditional
litigation forum with substantial assurances that if a miscarriage of justice,
or even an innocent mistake occurs at trial, there will be adequate
opportunity to seek redress before a final judgment is entered. 123 Because
the courts are generally precluded from engaging in any form of substantive
review of the arbitrator's interpretation and application of relevant contract
language and law or to review in any significant way the manner in which
the hearing was conducted by the arbitrator, this protection is missing in
commercial arbitration. Clearly, this state of affairs greatly enhances the
risks inherent in unskilled conduct of the hearing and undisciplined analysis
of the merits by the arbitrator.
It goes without saying that arbitrators are duty-bound to resist the
temptation, raised by the absence of an effective appeals device, to discount
questions of procedure raised at the hearing, or to shortcut the analytical
process in deciding the cases before them. Of more importance is the
question of whether, over the long run, parties and their attorneys will
continue to be willing to commit themselves to a binding, no-appeals
dispute resolution process whose adjudicators are not required to articulate
their reasons for decision or to reveal the analysis that leads to decision.
Because they have no desire to add to overcrowded civil court dockets,
the federal and state judiciaries and their legislative counterparts are not
likely to change the prevailing rule precluding appeals of the merits of
commercial arbitration awards. This reality provides further support for the
Authors' prior assertion as to the need for discourse on the question of the
advisability and utility of substantive written awards and/or other on-the-
record decision points (e.g., through the decision of pre-hearing motions)
that provide the parties and their attorneys with insight as to the manner in
which the arbitrator has resolved key factual issues, identified and
interpreted the relevant law, and applied that law to the facts.
F. Conclusion
The preceding description of contemporary commercial arbitration
reveals several dimensions of the current process that may limit its long-run
viability as a widely-employed substitute for traditional litigation. The
successful evolution of commercial arbitration will require that each of these
matters be fully and thoughtfully debated and resolved. In order to provide
a concrete starting point for this dialogue as to the proper future direction
and character of commercial arbitration, in the next two Sections the
Authors will articulate their vision of the commercial arbitration process at
123 SeeJAMESETr AL., supra note 118, § 12.8.
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maturity and the archetype of the commercial arbitrators who will be at the
center of that process and the key to its long-run viability.
V. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT MATURITY: A PROPOSED
MODEL
A. Introduction
It is the Authors' belief that the institution of commercial arbitration is
in need of retooling. Many of the dimensions of the existing mechanism do
not adequately contemplate the emerging new reality of alternative dispute
resolution and the demands that reality will place on the arbitration process
and arbitrators. Commercial arbitration must be brought to a new,
heightened level of rigor and sophistication of the nature required by the
increasingly complex and significant disputes it is being routinely called
upon to resolve.
If commercial arbitration is to provide a viable, acceptable alternative
to adjudication in the state and federal courts, it must become a more
mature, more righteous process, guided by an identifiable corps of highly
competent, sophisticated true neutrals. Those neutrals must consistently
demonstrate to the parties, and the attorneys who represent them, that they
are capable of producing thoughtful, well-reasoned results within the
context of a procedurally and substantively fair adjudicatory framework.
Although a certain degree of specialization is inevitable and well-
advised the Authors contend that commercial arbitration should be viewed
holistically, rather than as consisting of a number of separate, discrete fora
(securities, construction, employment, etc.). The practice of commercial
arbitration must come to be seen as a singular profession, centered on a
uniform model of process, outcomes, expectations, and neutral
competencies. Otherwise, commercial arbitration will not fulfill its promise
and the expectations placed on it by those who advocate its widespread use.
B. The Essential Characteristics of the Mature Commercial
Arbitration Model
The Authors believe the dialogue they advocate must focus on
developing a commercial arbitration mechanism that reflects the following
characteristics:
1. It will assure consistency across proceedings and among
arbitrators aimed at the goal of making the arbitration of
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commercial disputes a "business as usual" proposition, as opposed
to the major event that is the typical law suit.
2. It will facilitate more skillful, expert administration of the
overall process focused on the goal of ensuring that commercial
arbitration becomes a consistent, predictable, and time/cost
effective process that can be relied upon to produce accurate,
correct, and comprehensible results.
3. It will encourage the parties to match the structure of the
arbitration tribunal with the particular dispute at issue and to make
an informed, rational selection of the arbitrator(s).
4. It will provide for adequate pre-hearing discovery and
notice pleading without unnecessarily extending the time, expense,
and bother required.
5. It will establish a mechanism for ensuring that the parties
fully explore and carefully consider the advisability of a pre-
arbitration mediation effort.
6. It will propel litigators to take full advantage of the expert
adjudicator by avoiding the use of jury trial tactics and related
histrionics, and minimizing the intramural hostility that often arises
between opposing counsel.
7. It will strike an appropriate middle ground regarding the
rules of evidence and hearing procedure that fully contemplates
(and takes advantage of) the skills and adjudicatory expertise of the
experienced commercial arbitrator.
8. It will give the parties an adequate range of options
pertaining to the award/decision stage of the arbitration
proceeding, particularly with regard to the parties' preference for a
full-blown analysis and award versus a simple "thumbs up or
down" decision.
In the commentary below the Authors will set forth their thoughts as to
the steps necessary to ensure that, at maturity, commercial arbitration
satisfies each of these criteria.
382
[Vol. 10:2 1995]
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN EVOLUTION
C. The Key Components of the Mature Commercial Arbitration
Model
1. Structure of the Arbitration Tribunal
The Authors contend that the efficacy and cost effectiveness of the
commercial arbitration mechanism can be substantially enhanced if, at the
front-end of the process, the parties make a deliberate, thoughtful decision
as to the manner in which the arbitration tribunal is structured. More often
than not in the current practice the parties accept whatever format is
advocated by the neutral appointing authority. Although the AAA, JAMS,
and Endispute frameworks all presume a single-arbitrator format,124 the
Authors' experience indicates that under the AAA procedures there is a de
facto predisposition toward use of a three-neutral arbitrators configuration.
There is nothing inherently wrong with either the single-arbitrator or
the three-neutral arbitrators format. Nevertheless, the Authors maintain that
the parties and counsel should be given a clear opportunity and be
encouraged to make an informed, thoughtful choice of the tribunal structure
most appropriate to the dispute at hand. In the discussion below, the relative
attributes of the three major variations of the arbitration tribunal are
enumerated.
There are certain, obvious advantages and disadvantages to each option.
The single-arbitrator framework offers a clear cost advantage over the
multiple-arbitrator schemes. In addition, logistical matters pertaining to
arbitrator selection, scheduling of hearing dates, and the like are greatly
simplified under a single neutral format. Finally, if the single arbitrator has
a proven track record as a neutral and the parties are familiar with the
arbitrator's hearing conduct, analytical abilities, and other attributes, the
predictability of the arbitral experience is greatly enhanced, and the prospect
of unpleasant surprise once the arbitration tribunal is impaneled is
minimized.
On its face, the single arbitrator variant seems most appropriate for less
complex, lower-stakes disputes, where there is little risk that the arbitrator's
decision process will be confused or misdirected. In such cases there is little
concrete gain to be realized by paying three arbitrators to complete a task
the parties and their counsel are confident can be effectively handled by a
single neutral.
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The three-neutral arbitrator format offers the benefits to be gained from
the perceptions and pooled judgment of multiple objective adjudicators. 125
At the same time, the fact finding process and the analysis of the merits can
benefit further from the routine inclusion of at least one non-lawyer
arbitrator who may also be an expert in the subject matter of the particular
controversy. On the downside, the three-neutral arbitrator configuration
brings with it tripled cost for arbitrator per diem charges and expenses, as
well as increased scheduling and related logistical difficulties.
A second variant of the three-arbitrator option that is seldom considered
in commercial arbitration is the use of a tripartite panel composed of a
single neutral chair and two advocate arbitrators, each representing the
respective interests of the party that selects them as arbitrator. The use of
advocate arbitrators does little to enhance the objective, neutral evaluation
of the merits of the case. The parties must rely on the abilities and judgment
of the neutral chair in that regard. In exchange for the attribute of pooled,
multiple judgment by three neutrals, the tripartite panel format significantly
enhances the probability that the award and the deliberative process that
produces it will be founded on an accurate reading of the facts and a full
and correct grasp of the respective arguments of the parties. Ensuring that
the neutral chair achieves both is the role of the advocate arbitrator, during
the hearing and the deliberative sessions that follow which result in the
award. 126
The sharpening of the arbitrator's analysis that can be facilitated by the
tripartite format holds substantial promise for enhancing the rigor,
125 The analogy to civil appellate practice, in which appeals are typically heard by a
panel of at least three judges, is worth noting. As the Court of Appeals of New York has
remarked:
The right to have disputes adjusted by several rather than one arbitrator is not to
be lightly regarded. The widespread practice of parties to arbitration agreements
of making provision for those rights indicates the value placed upon them. Our
appellate systems are a result of the general view that there is less possibility for
error where the question for decision is to be considered by a tribunal consisting
of more than one person ....
Lipschutz v. Gutwirth, 106 N.E.2d 8, 10-11 (N.Y. 1952).
126 Arbitrators appointed directly by the parties are not expected to bring the level of
impartiality to the panel that would be required of arbitrators appointed as "true" neutrals.
Anderson v. Nichols, 359 S.E. 2d 117, 118 (W. Va. 1987); Astoria Medical Group v. HIP,
182 N.E.2d 85 (N.Y. 1962). As the court noted in the Astoria opinion, in discussing the role
of a party-appointed arbitrator, "[p]artisan he may be, but not dishonest." Astoria Medical
Group, 182 N.E.2d at 89.
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consistency, and perceived fairness of the arbitral decision-making process.
By obliging the neutral chair to articulate, discuss, and test her view of the
facts and the mode of analysis she is relying upon with the advocate
arbitrators, the parties can gain a significant level of assurance that the
arbitrator has truly mastered these crucial matters and relied on that mastery
in deciding the case. The Authors assert that the absence of that assurance in
the existing paradigm for commercial arbitration is a major flaw that must
be remedied in the mature model.
There are two collateral benefits to the tripartite mechanism that
warrant mention. First, thoughtful advocates will quickly realize that the
intrusion into the normally sacrosanct and inviolate arbitral chamber
affected by the involvement of advocate arbitrators can greatly enhance the
efficacy of advocacy assessment of arbitral competence. Today, given the
general absence of substantive written awards revealing the arbitrator's
findings of fact and conclusions of law, advocates and the parties they
represent are obliged to evaluate an arbitrator's competency and
acceptability based solely on the neutral's hearing conduct skills and the
result reached at the award stage. The Authors assert this is not a sufficient
basis for wise, thoughtful arbitrator selection decisions.
The second collateral advantage of the tripartite format is perhaps more
significant than the first. The labor arbitration experience with the tripartite
structure demonstrates that the extensive dialogue which typically transpires
between the neutral and advocate arbitrators at the deliberative stage, and
the search for consensus that lies at the core of that dialogue often lead to a
certain amount of brokering of the award, its wording, and even the
remedies directed. Purists may rail at this breaching of the chaste of the
arbitral decision-making process. Experienced advocates and neutrals will
not.
By tailoring and fine tuning the award in a manner that comports it with
the underlying reality from which the parties' dispute sprang, the neutral
chair-led exchanges that take place during the post-hearing executive
sessions can do much to serve the goal of producing outcomes perceived by
the parties to be fair that are also amenable to effective implementation
without further altercation or adjudication. In fact, it is likely that in
particular cases these executive sessions will often lead to mediated
settlements of all or portions of the parties' dispute. The Authors are
convinced that the enhanced possibility of achieving either of these results
warrants the risks to the purity of the arbitral decision-making process that
are inherent in the extensive neutral-advocate dialogue that often takes place
in tripartite arbitration.
The Authors submit that if advocates and the parties engage in the type
of thoughtful cost-benefit analysis suggested here they will, in most cases,
conclude that a single, properly-credentialed, fully-qualified neutral is the
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optimal choice. The three-neutral arbitrator panel is justified only where it
is truly believed that the perspective and input of one or more neutral non-
lawyer, subject-matter experts will significantly enhance the quality of
arbitral decision making. At the same time, the considerable potential
advantages of the tripartite framework for commercial arbitration propel the
Authors to contend that sophisticated advocates and parties should seriously
consider its use in appropriate cases.
Tripartite arbitration would seem particularly well-advised in matters
centering on highly technical issues and those presenting complex questions
of fact, law, or application of law to facts. It is also called for when the
rigor, accuracy, and palatability of the result reached in arbitration can be
substantially enhanced by the presence of advocate arbitrators at the
deliberative stage of the process. This is most likely to be true when there is
reason to doubt whether the neutral arbitrator can be adequately educated at
the hearing and/or where it is perceived that the clarity of the parties'
argument can be markedly enhanced by re-articulation during the post-
hearing deliberation stage.
2. Selection of the Arbitrator
At maturity, the commercial arbitration process will be guided by a
cadre of arbitrators of true neutral standing who share a minimal level of
proven competence, hearing conduct skills, and analytical abilities. It is
these individuals who will be primarily responsible for ensuring the long-
run viability of commercial arbitration. Accordingly, it is imperative that
the mature mechanism ensures the parties are able to make informed,
thoughtful selections of arbitrators from arrays made up only of qualified
professionals.
a. The Establishment and Evaluation of Threshold Credentials
Even in the absence of extensive empirical research into the
qualifications and perceived competencies of today's commercial arbitrators,
there can be little doubt that the front end of existing arbitrator selection
mechanisms, the process of credentialing commercial arbitrators for
placement on the panels from which selections are made, needs to be
rethought. Today, many commercial arbitration panels are cluttered with
unqualified or marginally-qualified arbitrators who stand little hope of
achieving long-term acceptability. As a result of
credentialing/training/evaluation schemes that are of insufficient rigor, the
task of gleaning those panel members qualified to serve from those not
qualified to serve is left largely to the parties through the selection process.
The Authors assert this must change.
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The neutral appointing authorities must assume a larger part of the
burden for winnowing from the ranks of those who wish to be commercial
arbitrators the individuals who have little realistic prospect of becoming
same. A truly mature and sophisticated dispute resolution mechanism cannot
leave the parties and their attorneys questioning the threshold qualifications,
baseline competencies, the neutrality, and suitability of large numbers of the
prospective arbitrators from among whom they are expected to select.
Severe damage is done to the process and the arbitration profession when
the parties are obliged to select out substantial numbers of prospective
neutrals on these grounds. The parties and their advocates have a legitimate
right to expect consistent levels of arbitral qualifications and competency, as
well as proven neutrality among the candidate arbitrators they are provided.
At the same time it is not clear that in the majority of cases the parties
are well served by limiting the universe from which commercial arbitrators
are selected to retired judges. Certainly, retired judges are one valuable
source of potential commercial arbitrators. The relatively high levels of
trial-related and decision-making skills retired judges bring to the
commercial arbitration venue enable them to provide valuable input into the
evolution and refinement of the process. Nevertheless, because commercial
arbitration is intended to provide an alternative to traditional litigation and
not constitute a lower-case clone of that process, there is room to question
whether the perspective of retired senior members of the judiciary is the
appropriate predominate neutral mindset for the mature commercial
arbitration model.
There is also reason to doubt whether there are enough retired judges to
meet the demand for arbitral services at maturity of the process. Further
cause for concern is presented by the impact of a uniform "judges-only"
policy on the diversity (age, gender, race, etc.) of the arbitral profession.
Finally, there are the risks of permitting the commercial arbitration
profession to be dominated by older individuals who view the work as an
avocation or a pleasant diversion from retirement, rather than as a long-term
endeavor at the core of their long-run professional careers.
The Authors submit that neither imprecise schemes for credentialing
arbitrators, nor the alternative of relying on rigid minimal qualification
standards is a suitable means of ensuring an adequate, diverse, and
constantly-renewed supply of competent neutrals who have made a long-
term commitment to the practice and the profession of commercial
arbitration. Instead, the neutral appointing authorities who provide litigants
with panels of potential arbitrators would serve their clients better by
carefully fashioning a set of well thought-out general guidelines
(educational, experiential, and related credentials) for screening applicants
to their panels. Those guidelines should focus on identifying individuals
who either possess the requisite subject matter knowledge and process-
387
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
centered and analytical skills at the time of their application to the panels, or
in the alternative have a very high potential for developing those attributes.
As discussed below, this closer scrutiny of threshold credentials,
qualifications, and abilities must be linked with more extensive and
demanding pre-panel appointment regimens of training and exacting
evaluation of the candidates who satisfy the initial standards for panel
placement.
In order to maximize the age, gender, race, educational, and
experiential diversity of the commercial arbitration corps, while at the same
time preventing the profession from becoming a closed shop, it may well be
that the initial emphasis in this regard should be placed more on the
training/evaluation of candidates and new arbitrator development programs
than on the satisfaction of inviolable threshold qualificational standards. In
addition, there must be a provision for a significant, ongoing effort at
evaluating the performance and skills of the panel members who are selected
to serve as arbitrators in order to facilitate culling those individuals whose
performance indicates that they are not suited for selection. Finally, panel
members who are not selected to serve as arbitrators after a reasonable
number of listings over a reasonable period of time should be removed from
the panel.
b. The Need to Facilitate More Informed Arbitrator Selection Decisions
Advocates today often find themselves making arbitrator selection
decisions (or more accurately stated, decisions to strike names of arbitrators
they do not wish to use from the rosters of arbitrators they are provided)
based on scant information as to the credentials, qualifications, hearing-
conduct, and analytical skills of those individuals. At the present early stage
of the profession's development, there is little reliable word of mouth
information available as to the various competencies of the arbitrators
whose names appear on the panels submitted to the parties. Thus, the
attorneys who usually make the arbitrator selection decision must rely
almost entirely on the very limited information contained in the typical
arbitrator biographical sketch provided by the neutral appointing authority.
The Authors maintain that the various neutral appointing authorities
must take the steps necessary to enhance the depth, breadth, and accuracy of
the arbitrator biographical and performance-related information they
provide the parties. Representative of the type of data required for a
thoughtful arbitrator selection decision are the following: 127
127 Some of this information is currently provided to the parties to varying extents under
the procedures of the various neutral appointing authorities.
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e more detailed biographies, the accuracy of which has been
fully verified;
e data providing additional insight as to the acceptability of the
neutral (number of times listed, number of times selected, number
of times chair, number of awards issued);
* a recapitulation of the types of issues arbitrated and the types
of parties served/industries arbitrated in the past;
* information as to the outcomes achieved in cases that have
gone to an award (number of awards for claimant, number of
awards for respondent, and, on a case-by-case basis, the amount
and type of relief sought/damages (amount and type), and other
relief awarded);
I some manner of feedback from the advocates and parties who
have presented cases before the listed arbitrators, providing insight
as to those neutrals' hearing conduct and related skills, their grasp
of the subject matter of the particular controversies; and
e where feasible, prior awards of the arbitrator, especially
those containing substantive analysis. 128
Once this augmented data is made available to the parties they must use
it wisely.
c. Making Intelligent Arbitrator Selection Decisions
In selecting the arbitrator, the advocates and their clients must keep the
goal of that process squarely in mind, to wit: the selection of arbitrators
who have proven themselves capable of conducting fair hearings and
objectively deciding the matters in dispute. The Authors' experience
indicates that too often advocates center much of their energies at this stage
on attempting to secure the appointment of an arbitrator that they believe
will be favorably predisposed to their case, while at the same time
128 Of course, availability of the arbitrator's awards would be premised on the
permission of the parties to the disputes in which they arose. Although the release of such
awards to third parties may seem a radical departure from current thinking about the closed
nature of the commercial arbitration process, reference to the widespread distribution and
publication of labor arbitration awards and even the publication of court opinions indicate that
it may become a reality at the mature stage of commercial arbitration.
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attempting to prevent the selection of an arbitrator they perceive to be
hostile either to their position on the merits or the type of client they
represent.
An example of this second dynamic is the tendency of attorneys to
apply the same conflict of interest standards utilized in determining if the
attorney-client relationship will be established as the basis for striking listed
arbitrators. The Authors suggest that the parties in commercial arbitration
would be well advised to devote less attention to factors like the prior
advocacy record of a listed arbitrator and other possible indicia of a
predisposition toward the case of one party and focus more on the listed
individuals' proven arbitral abilities and current standing and reputation as
an objective, acceptable neutral.
d. Ensuring Adequate Levels of Arbitrator Compensation
The neutral appointing authorities that credential commercial arbitrators
and the advocates and parties who select from among those certified as
qualified to serve must acknowledge the importance of assuring that
arbitrator compensation levels accurately reflect the importance and
difficulty of the work. Although there are exceptions, currently, the bulk of
arbitrator per diem charges range from $400 to $1,000, with a strong bias
toward the lower end of the range. 129
As noted earlier, under the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules,
arbitrators are expected to serve the first hearing day on a pro bono basis, 130
and are limited to one compensated study day for every five days of
hearing. Under the AAA Supplementary Procedures for Large, Complex
Disputes, arbitrator compensation levels are "based upon the magnitude and
complexity of the case . . "131 No doubt, the contemporary mode of
arbitrator compensation springs from the origins of commercial arbitration
as a vehicle for resolving relatively simple disputes through the use of
arbitrators asked to serve on a largely pro bono basis. The Authors assert
that the time has come for these existing arbitrator compensation schemes to
be rethought.
The ADR world has changed drastically in the last decade. No longer
are commercial arbitrators called upon primarily to serve as the rough
equivalent of a small claims court. The issues addressed have grown more
129 In the course of their initial research, the Authors requested summary arbitrator
compensation data from AAA, JAMS, and Endispute. That information was reported to be
unavailable. Accordingly, the above estimates of the range of per diem and hourly rates are
based on anecdotal information available to the Authors.
130 A.A.A. COMMERcIAL ARBITRATION Rule 50 (1993).
131 A.A.A. SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURE Rule 3(c) (1993).
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complex, and the typical amounts in controversy, as well as the time
commitment required of the arbitrator for hearing and study, have increased
dramatically. The parties are represented by highly skilled attorneys who
charge their normal hourly rates ranging from $150 to $350 or more, or on
the plaintiff's side, are compensated subject to a contingency fee
arrangement that entitles them to a substantial portion of the claimant's
recovery.
The Authors submit it makes no sense for the individuals who are
tasked with the responsibility of deciding the weighty matters now being
advanced to commercial arbitration and asked to make the type of extensive
time commitments required of that work to be paid less than the attorneys
who argue the cases before them. The simple truth is that professionals who
are worth $200 to $300 per hour or more when serving as advocates,
executives, or in other professional capacities must be deemed deserving of
the same levels of compensation when serving as commercial arbitrators.
Commercial arbitration is becoming a very serious business. It must be
overseen and led by serious, adequately-compensated arbitrators.
Otherwise, the bulk of commercial arbitration work will be left to retirees,
persons who view the work only as an avocation, or those whose true
market value is in the range of current compensation levels.
This is not to say that in the mature model there cannot be a significant
role for otherwise competent neutrals who, for whatever reasons, are
willing to work at less than a fair market rate. The point is that over the
long run, holding arbitrator compensation levels at artificially and
unrealistically low levels will discourage many highly-qualified individuals
from entering the arbitration profession, and do much to prevent the
development of the adequate corps of true professionals that is essential to
the successful institutionalization of the process.
When juxtaposed with attorneys' fees, administrative costs, and the
inevitable tying up of valuable executive time inherent in arbitration, the
cost of adequate arbitrator compensation would remain a comparatively
minor matter. Concerns pertaining to minimizing arbitrator fees and
expenses could perhaps be ameliorated in many cases through a thoughtful
evaluation by the parties of the efficacy of a single-arbitrator format as
opposed to a three-arbitrator panel. In the same manner, careful
comparisons of the costs versus the value received for various arbitrators
could provide a useful decision tool for keeping arbitrator-related expenses
within reasonable bounds.
3. The Pre-Hearing Stage
There are three primary topics of significance here: (1) mediation; (2)
pre-hearing discovery; and (3) pre-hearing motion practice. The
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observations in this subSection are premised on the Authors' belief that the
properly-credentialed, competent arbitrator is the person best-equipped to
oversee the pre-hearing stage. Accordingly, the Authors assert that the case
handling procedures of the neutral appointing authorities, as well as the
procedures independently developed by the parties in particular disputes,
should be fashioned so as to interject the arbitrator into the dispute at the
earliest possible time. As few matters of substance or significance as
possible should be addressed before the arbitrator is selected and brought
on-line. At the same time, it is submitted that the parties and the process
would be well served by augmenting the existing procedural rules for the
pre-hearing stage in order to strongly encourage mediation and ensure
adequate discovery, as well as promote consistency across proceedings in
both of these areas.
a. Mediation
Once selected, aside from rudimentary ministerial and clerical matters,
the arbitrator should immediately be assigned full responsibility for
oversight and timely closure of the pre-hearing proceedings. 1 2 First and
foremost among those matters must be a full exploration of the possibility
and potential utility of mediation. The Authors strongly assert that a mere
suggestion of the availability of mediation by a case administrator employed
by the neutral appointing authority is not enough to propel the parties to
seriously consider that dispute resolution option when they are not already
predisposed to do so.
Accordingly, where the nature of the dispute and the circumstances
indicate mediation may be fruitful, the parties should be tactfully, yet
forcefully encouraged to utilize it. This is a task most well-suited to the
arbitrator who will decide the case if it is not resolved short of adjudication.
Although this threshold effort will require tact and discretion, it is within
the province of a skilled arbitrator to explain to the parties the benefits, the
dynamics, and the procedure of mediation, as well as assure them that this
preliminary effort at resolving their dispute will have no effect on their
respective cases should the matter proceed to arbitration.
It seems clear that the earlier in the process that mediation is initiated,
the better. More often than not, the level of animosity and the rigidity of the
parties and their attorneys increases the further they progress through the
process of deposition, interrogatories, and document production,
particularly when there has been no effective mechanism for resolving the
disagreements that inevitably arise during that process. Therefore, the
132 In carrying out these responsibilities, the arbitrator would work closely with the
administrator assigned to the case by the neutral appointing authority.
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Authors contend that the mediation inquiry should be made by the arbitrator
at the earliest appropriate moment.
If mediation can be initiated before the positions of the parties have
hardened, and the damage and the expense inherent in extensive pre-
adjudication skirmishes is incurred, the prospects for a successful
conciliation effort will be substantially increased. Finding a way for
routinely facilitating this early intervention by a competent mediator is
essential and constitutes an important point for dialogue.
An additional question that should be addressed in the dialogue that the
Authors hope to engender is whether the individual selected as arbitrator
should be permitted to mediate the dispute. The conventional view, as
reflected in AAA Rule 10, is that it is inappropriate for the arbitrator to
mediate. 133 The Authors do not quibble with the general proposition that
caution must be exercised when assignment of the mediation task to the
arbitrator is contemplated, in order to avoid improperly mixing the role of
the mediator/conciliator with that of the adjudicator. Regardless, the facial
validity of this conventional view must be evaluated in light of the fact that
trial judges frequently engage in informal mediation efforts and failing full
resolution of the controversy, proceed comfortably to the adjudicatory role.
Further instructive in this regard is the occasional effective use of "med-
arb" (mediation-arbitration where one neutral performs both the mediation
and, if necessary, the arbitration functions) in the labor-management dispute
resolution field.
The Authors acknowledge the risk inherent in arbitrators mediating and
the ethical concerns that may arise regarding misuse of the information and
insight accrued during mediation. In order to preserve the separation
between the mediation and arbitration processes, arbitrators who mediate
would be particularly well-advised to avoid engaging in premature
evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the parties' respective cases.
Nevertheless, use of the "med-arb" hybrid device in the limited
133 A.A.A. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION Rule 10 (1993). Rule 10 states: "The mediator
shall not be an arbitrator appointed to the case." Cf. ENDISPUTE ARBITRATION RULES AND
PROCEDURES B-19 which provides:
The Endispute mediator assigned to the ease will not be the Arbitrator or any of the
Arbitrator candidates submitted to the parties. The parties may also agree to seek the
assistance of the Arbitrator in reaching a settlement. However, the Arbitrator's assistance in
such settlement efforts will not disqualify the Arbitrator from serving as Arbitrator if
settlement is not reached.
See also, Lon Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION 247
(Stephen R. Goldberg et al. eds., 1985).
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circumstances where it is appropriate may be an experiment worth
undertaking. The Authors maintain that at the very least, arbitrators and the
neutral appointing authorities should remain alert to the possibility that as
the level of ADR experience and sophistication of the parties increases, they
will more frequently request the arbitrator to attempt mediation of all or
some of the matters at issue.
Regardless of when mediation is initiated or whether it is deemed
appropriate for the arbitrator to mediate, the Authors are convinced that
devising a methodology for effectively pairing mediation with arbitration
will be a key to the evolution of a viable ADR mechanism that will provide
civil disputants and their attorneys with an acceptable, truly effective
alternative to traditional litigation. Allowing mediation to remain the minor
dimension of the ADR process that it so often is today would be a serious
mistake.
b. Pre-Hearing Discovery
In recent years, as the amounts in controversy and complexity of many
of the disputes submitted to arbitration have increased, recognition has
emerged of the need to provide some manner of enhanced structure and
discipline to the pre-hearing discovery process. As observed earlier, today's
commercial arbitration rules pertaining to discovery are of a very general
nature. The Authors assert that rudimentary rules of the type reflected in
AAA Commercial Arbitration Rule 10 and Rule 5(b)-(d) of the
Association's Supplementary Procedures for Large, Complex Cases are not
sufficient to facilitate effective, consistent arbitral oversight of the discovery
process.
Instead, the Authors suggest that in all commercial arbitration cases,
especially those of a more complex nature, the process would be aided by
the promulgation of more detailed discovery rules loosely modeled after the
new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26, 30, 33, and 37.134 That brief
compilation of rules would accomplish the following:
" set a maximum time period for the completion of discovery;
" require an early exchange of witness lists, documentary
evidence likely to be introduced at hearing, and information
pertaining to damages and insurance;
e mandate early disclosures regarding expert witnesses and
their testimony;
134 FED. R. Crv. P. 26, 30, 33, 37.
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e set a reasonable maximum number of depositions and written
interrogatories allowed; and
* preclude the introduction at hearing of any evidence subject
to disclosure or discovery pursuant to the rules that was not
revealed in a timely manner during the pre-hearing stage.
Of course, any such rules should provide for exception with leave of the
arbitrator for good cause.
As previously indicated, the Authors contend that the timing of the
arbitrator's appointment should be such that he or she will supervise the
discovery process virtually from its start and be responsible for promptly
resolving any disputes that may arise. The goal in enhancing the discovery-
related rules in commercial arbitration and tasking the arbitrator to oversee
the process should be to optimize the benefits of adequate discovery (i.e.,
assuring the parties gain full knowledge of the relevant facts and facilitating
the objective assessment of the relative strengths and weaknesses of their
cases) while at the same time minimizing the time, effort, and resources
expended. Where that point of optimality lies is a matter for dialogue.
c. Pre-Hearing Motion Practice
As observed earlier, there are two dimensions to pre-hearing motion
practice in commercial arbitration. The first embraces motions to sharpen
the pleadings and more clearly define the issues to be arbitrated and motions
to ascertain the proper parties. Currently, these types of motions are on
occasion submitted to and competently decided by commercial arbitrators.
There is no reason to alter the current practice. The second dimension, pre-
hearing motions potentially dispositive of the merits of the dispute (e.g. the
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and the motion for summary
judgment), is not a routine feature of contemporary commercial arbitration.
It is the Authors' belief that under one condition and with one caveat,
the process of commercial arbitration would not be well served by the
routinization of the pre-hearing motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
and the motion for summary judgment. The condition on which this
assertion rests is a procedural requirement obliging the arbitrator to
articulate the key findings of fact, identify the controlling contract
provisions and applicable law, and state how, when the controlling contract
provisions or law are applied to the material facts, the case is resolved in
favor of the claimant or the respondent. If that arbitral act is procedurally
ensured, then the parties can be confident the key questions of law and the
questions of material fact at the heart of their dispute will be squarely
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addressed and resolved on the record. With that assurance in place, the
goals of expediting the pre-hearing process and focusing the parties' and the
arbitrator's efforts on the hearing and the award warrant dispensing with
these two pre-hearing motions that constitute a major component of the
traditional litigation model.
The caveat is the adoption of an express procedural rule permitting the
parties to submit the case to the arbitrator for decision without hearing, on
written briefs or oral argument, where following discovery they are able to
stipulate to all of the material facts. 135 The probability of the parties being
able to stipulate to all of the material facts in anything but the most simple
controversies may be quite remote. This very limited device for achieving
adjudication without hearing could serve to truncate the process and
minimize the parties' expense, therefore provision for it is advised.
4. The Hearing
The primary areas of concern pertaining to the actual arbitration
hearing that merit discussion go to the mode of arbitral conduct of the
hearing, advocacy tactics and the rules of evidence. The contemporary
commercial arbitrator is provided little in the way of procedural guidelines
as to the manner in which the hearing is to be conducted. The conventional
wisdom underlying this general lack of structure centers on the belief that
arbitration can remain a relatively simple, expeditious process only if the
rules governing it are kept to a minimum. This premise is generally sound.
Nevertheless, the Authors assert that the time has come for a rethinking of
the balance between the simplicity and succinctness of the procedural
framework for commercial arbitration and the need to supplement that
framework in order to ensure that arbitrators conduct hearings that truly are
acceptable surrogates for the due process guarantees and the rigor inherent
in court trials.13 6
Despite the long-standing belief that arbitration is intended to be a
simpler, more expeditious vehicle for adjudication than is traditional
litigation, the fact remains that few of the attorneys who argue cases before
commercial arbitrators adjust their trial advocacy tactics to any significant
degree in order to take advantage of the simplified hearing format and the
presence of an expert adjudicator. The arbitral experience of and anecdotal
135 ENDISPUTE COMPARATIVE ARBITRATION Rule C-15.3 speaks to "[m]otions for
summary decision" on mutual agreement of the parties and submission to the Arbitrator of
.written statements of their positions on the Motion . . . ." Although likely a condition
precedent, it is not clear from the face of Rule C-15.3 whether this motion requires that the
parties be able to stipulate to all of the material facts.
136 See Brunet, supra note 11.
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evidence available to the Authors suggests that at least in more complex,
higher-stakes cases this phenomenon often precludes significant savings of
time or expense at the hearing stage. 13
7
As a result of this reluctance by counsel to forego traditional trial
tactics and the related histrionics more suited to a jury trial, in all but the
most elementary disputes commercial arbitrators regularly find themselves
faced with perplexing questions of hearing procedure, most often with
regard to the admission of evidence. Thus, even though the attorneys who
argue cases before them more often than not rely on conventional trial
tactics, commercial arbitrators are somehow expected to keep things simple
and resolve complex and difficult questions of procedure and evidence
without instruction from any real substantive rules.
Placed in this predicament and lacking any substantive guidance as to
-how they are to proceed, arbitrators resort to a variety of standards for
decision and modes of hearing conduct. The Authors suggest the procedural
framework for commercial arbitration must address this reality. The area of
focus most likely to produce positive short-run results is the standards for
the admission of evidence. The current rudimentary standards for the
admission of evidence (e.g., "conformity to the legal rules of evidence shall
not be necessary," with a parallel instruction to heed the relevancy and
materiality of proffered evidence) needs to be supplemented in a manner
that reflects current hearing practice. The Authors advocate supplementing
the current evidentiary paradigm for commercial arbitration by adding the
following:
* a more adequate description and working definition of the
evidentiary standard of relevancy that articulates the "probative
value/prejudice to the non-proffering party" standard;
* a highly-simplified version of the hearsay evidence rule,
incorporating a clear definition of "hearsay evidence" and
specifying certain, limited exceptions thereto that are particularly
relevant in a commercial arbitration context (e.g., the exception
pertaining to records kept in the customary course of business);
* a rule encouraging the use of fact stipulations by the parties
and specifically empowering the arbitrator to request same where
warranted;
* a rule sanctioning arbitral notice of adjudicative facts not in
dispute;
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o a rule clearly defining cumulative evidence, which grants the
arbitrator authority either to exclude such evidence, or take arbitral
notice of it. 138
The assertion that the commercial arbitration process would benefit
from a moderate flushing out of the standards for the admission of evidence
is based on two dimensions of the current practice. First, despite the
admonition that the rules of evidence do not apply, commercial arbitrators
familiar with those rules often find themselves obliged to rely on some
semblance of those standards when presented with evidentiary objections.
The rules governing commercial arbitration must acknowledge this reality.
The second reason underlying the Authors' assertion is the more
significant one. The attorneys who argue cases in the commercial arbitration
forum persist in raising objections founded on the rules of evidence because
they are conditioned to do so and because they perceive those objections to
be an important factor in maintaining the integrity of the fact-finding
process and thereby adequately representing their clients. The absence of
clear evidentiary guidelines in commercial arbitration inevitably leads
advocates to fall back on the rules of evidence which frame the remainder of
their litigation practice.
If arbitrators do not respond to these objections with consistent,
predictable, and comprehensible rulings, the rigor of the commercial
arbitration fact-finding process will come into serious question. At the same
time, arbitral failure to exercise sufficient diligence in supervising the
admission of evidence into the record by, as it often does, allowing proof
into the record "for what it is worth" further undermines confidence in, and
unnecessarily extends and muddles the arbitral fact-finding process by
inviting endless rounds of rebuttal and surrebuttal, cumulative evidence, and
the like.
At a minimum, evidentiary rulings must reflect a clear understanding of
the concepts of relevancy, probative value, and undue prejudice. That result
can be achieved by the supplemental evidentiary standards advocated above
and by ensuring, through adequate training and ongoing performance
evaluation, that arbitrators are facile with them and the principles of
procedural and substantive due process on which they are founded. The
residual web of the rules of evidence relied on in traditional litigation will
138 See, e.g., ENDISPUTE COMPARATIVE ARBITRATION Rule C-17.1 (providing, "The
Arbitrator may impose time limits on each phase of the proceeding and may limit the
testimony to exclude evidence that would be immaterial or unduly repetitive, provided that all
Parties are afforded the opportunity to present material and relevant evidence.").
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remain in the background, available when appropriate to gloss the
evidentiary rulings of arbitrators who are familiar with them.
It can be hoped that over time, litigators will come to realize the value
of fine tuning their trial advocacy tactics to take advantage of the unique
aspects of the commercial arbitration forum and the neutrals who oversee it.
In the meantime, arbitrators must be given the direction necessary to ensure
consistency of decision, rule, and procedure within the context of the
current practice. Adoption of a full-blown evidentiary paradigm on the
order of the Federal Rules of Evidence is not called for, and in fact would
be highly dysfunctional. Instead, the Authors advocate a restriking of the
evidentiary standard that more accurately reflects the nature of the
contemporary commercial arbitration hearing and moves toward an
appropriate midpoint on the evidentiary continuum.
That augmented standard would both set the proper tone for the hearing
and provide a sufficient basis for cogent, rational evidentiary rulings by the
arbitrator. The integrity and rigor of the arbitral fact-finding process would
benefit from changes that produce more consistent, predictable, and
defensible evidentiary rulings. In addition, it would effectively discourage
counsel from attempts to burden the record with marginally relevant,
cumulative or unduly prejudicial evidence, and/or to inordinately limit the
evidence adduced by opposing counsel. The precise mix of evidentiary
standards necessary to achieve these parallel goals is a matter for dialogue.
5. The Post-Hearing Stage
The sole issue of significance here is the question of the utility and
advisability of post-hearing briefs. The conventional wisdom is that post-
hearing briefs are not necessary or appropriate in most commercial
arbitration cases. There are several reasons for this belief. First, post-
hearing briefs are not a routine feature of traditional civil litigation. In
addition, under the traditional litigation model, counsel usually have had a
full opportunity to advance their respective contentions regarding the
identification and application of the relevant law and contract language
during pre-trial motion practice and the jury instruction stage. Thus, in
commercial arbitration attorneys are pre-disposed to follow traditional trial
practice and to make oral closing arguments. Further, the additional delay
and expense (for attorney time and arbitrator study time) inherent in the
decision to file post-hearing briefs mitigate against post-hearing submissions
in commercial arbitration.
The Authors maintain that the process of commercial arbitration and the
interest of the parties would benefit from a methodical determination, on a
case-by-case basis as to whether post-hearing briefs are warranted. In many
instances, where the facts are straightforward and the questions of law and
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contract interpretation comparatively simple, post-hearing briefs would not
enhance the quality of the adjudicative process and thus would not be cost
or time effective. However, when in a particular case post-hearing briefs
would significantly elevate the quality of argument, and thereby enhance the
rigor of arbitral analysis, the long-standing presumption in commercial
arbitration that briefs are not warranted should not control.
The decision as to whether briefs are advised is made on two levels.
Although it is most obviously a matter to be determined by counsel, it is
also incumbent on the arbitrator to request briefs if they are necessary in
order to ensure a full and rigorous analysis of the issues. 139 The Authors
suggest that the following case characteristics should propel both arbitrators
and advocates to conclude that post-hearing briefs are warranted:
- complex facts that require careful ordering and integration in
order to be fully comprehended;
e complex questions of the identification and interpretation of
law and/or contract language, especially those of a nature that in
traditional litigation would have given rise to and been addressed in
a motion to dismiss and subsequent order;
* complex questions of application of law to facts, especially
those of a nature that in traditional litigation would have been
addressed in a motion for summary judgment and subsequent
order; and
e where the nature of the dispute or the desires of the parties
call for a full-blown written award setting forth the arbitrator's
findings of fact and legal/contractual analysis.
In these circumstances advocates and arbitrators alike will experience a need
to ensure that the neutral's evaluation of the dispute is informed by a careful
recapitulation of the key evidence in the record and a methodical
articulation of each party's position on the merits. The written post-hearing
brief is the most reliable vehicle for achieving that result.
139 In this regard, arbitrators must be sensitive to the fact that it is difficult for an
attorney not to offer to file a post-hearing brief when queried in the presence of the client. In
the same manner, when the attorney for one party offers to submit a post-hearing brief,
opposing counsel invariably will respond to that challenge by offering to do the same. This
reality obliges the arbitrator to consider the advisability of discussing the matter of post-
hearing briefs with counsel in the absence of clients, in order to maximize the prospect of a
careful, reasoned decision.
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Viewed from the perspective of counsel, there are two additional
factors that strongly indicate briefs. The first is obvious. The larger the
amount in controversy and the more important the dispute to the interests of
the client, the substantial risk of not filing a brief likely will outweigh the
additional expense and delay inherent in the decision to submit a post-
hearing brief. Second, when as a result of the arbitrator's conduct at the
hearing, an advocate is concerned that the arbitrator has failed to grasp the
theory of the client's case or is unclear as to the material facts, the relevant
law, or contract language, the opportunity to ameliorate that omission
through the post-hearing brief should not be foregone.
6. The Arbitration Award
The conventional wisdom of commercial arbitration dictates that the
arbitrator's award should be kept as brief as possible and reveal as little as
possible of the analytical process that leads the arbitrator to the result
achieved. The Authors assert that as commercial arbitration moves toward
maturity, this conventional wisdom needs to be re-examined.
Besides minimizing the expense and delay associated with extensive
arbitrator study time in formulating the award, the most obvious goal served
by avoiding substantive written awards in commercial arbitration is
eliminating the primary basis (i.e., faulty arbitral reasoning as revealed in
the award) on which an attempt to vacate the award can be founded. Those
who advocate summary awards fear that inclusion in the arbitration award
of substantive analysis disclosing the arbitral reasoning which led to the
identification of the controlling law and contract language, the key findings
of material fact, and the application of the controlling law to the material
facts will provide judges otherwise inclined to intervene in order to produce
correct results with a window of opportunity that they will be unable to
resist.
On its face, the rationality of the conservative approach is difficult to
challenge. It is frequently noted in the case law that the essence of the
arbitration "bargain" is that the parties trade the increased risk of an
erroneous outcome for speed of resolution, privacy, and reduced costs. 140 If
that tradeoff is indeed the bargain the parties have struck, it can be
forcefully argued that there is no reason for the parties to request, or for the
140 See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614
(1985); Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 832 P.2d 899 (Cal. Superior Ct. 1992); Mcllroy v.
PaineWebber, Inc., 989 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1993); Raiford v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., 903 F.2d 1410, 1413 (11th Cir. 1990); Marra Constructors, Inc. v. Cleveland
Metroparks Systems, 612 N.E.2d 806 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993); Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi
Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d 743, 751 n.12 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1141 (1986).
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arbitrator to provide, any rationale to support the award and/or remedy
order.
The minimalist award model also tracks well with the form and nature
of the general verdict in a jury trial. Similarly, until the effectuation of the
new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in January of 1994, even in bench
trials adjudicated without a jury, the presiding judge had the discretion to
provide as little in the way of substantive analysis as deemed advisable. 141
However, there is one important distinction between traditional litigation
and commercial arbitration that eviscerates this analogy.
In a court trial, the arguments of parties pertaining to identification and
application of the substantive law are for the most part addressed and
decided on the record. That on-the-record decision making transpires in the
course of written opinions or oral rulings from the bench, most often in
response to motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment, and in
the trial judge's instructions to the jury. In addition, by use of the special
verdict device the parties can gain specific knowledge of the jury's or the
trial judge's determination of the material facts. Finally, the parties are
assured that any mistakes of law or erroneous application of law to fact that
they believe have transpired at trial will be definitively addressed and
resolved on appeal.
In commercial arbitration, in the absence of substantive written awards,
the parties are obliged to accept an adjudicative mechanism where the
substantive decision-making process remains almost completely off the
record. Thus, except for the basis for inference provided by the result
reached, the parties are left with virtually no insight as to the manner in
which the arbitrator decided the case. It is also possible that the practice of
avoiding a written rationale can be counterproductive to its supposed end of
minimizing attempts to secure judicial vacation or modification of the
award. An award without explanation may have the effect of encouraging an
appeal, because the losing side has been given no principled basis for
accepting, however reluctantly, the wisdom of the award. 142
141 See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). Rule 52(a) now makes clear that "[i]n all actions tried
upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially
and state separately its conclusions of law thereon ...."
142 As Judge Martin of United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has said,
[This case and many others reach our docket solely because the arbitrators fail to state the
reasons for their awards and decisions. While arbitrators are not obliged to the courts to
give their reasons for an award .... the absence of any evidence of an arbitrator's decision
process makes this Court's review of an arbitration award something of a judiciaship hurt
with counsel for the parties arguing about contract law analysis that may or may not have
been manifestly disregarded by the arbitrator.
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The Authors suggest it is this juxtaposition of the comparatively open,
on-the-record decision-making process in traditional litigation with the
largely undisclosed, off-the-record decision-making process inherent in
contemporary commercial arbitration that provides the true focal point for
dialogue as to the utility and advisability of written substantive awards in
the mature commercial arbitration model. The critical question that must be
addressed is whether the quality of the adjudications produced in
commercial arbitration, and the willingness of the parties to routinely accept
that alternative dispute resolution device as a substitute for traditional
litigation, will be enhanced by requiring arbitrators to write substantive
written awards that disclose the analytical process which leads to the arbitral
disposition of the dispute.
There are several significant value-added factors that can be reached by
giving the parties the option to request a written award. First, it will
provide concrete notice to the arbitrator of the parties' expectation that the
resolution of their dispute will be founded on careful, thoughtful efforts at:
(1) identifying the relevant law and contract language; (2) evaluating the
hearing record in order to discern the material facts adduced at hearing; and
(3) applying the relevant law and contract language to the material facts.
This increased assurance of thoughtful analysis should do much to
encourage the belief that arbitration produces accurate and correct results.
Second, the decision to require something more than a summary award will
surely oblige arbitrators to pay careful attention and remain fully engaged
throughout the proceedings.
Finally, written awards revealing the arbitrator's mode of analysis and
decision methodology will provide advocates with a very useful appliance
for facilitating evaluation of the neutral's knowledge of the substantive law
and the principles of contract interpretation, grasp of the evidence, and
analytical ability. As noted previously, in most cases today the only indicia
of these arbitrator competencies are the manner in which the neutral
conducts the hearing and the perceived correctness of the result reached.
The Authors contend that this scant evidence of competence is not a
sufficient basis for evaluating neutrals in the mature commercial arbitration
mode.
In the portion of the broad discourse the Authors hope to stimulate as to
the future of commercial arbitration concerning the optimal form and nature
of the written award, it will be important for the participants not to fall into
the trap of thinking dualistically. Thus, it may be that the optimal form of
the award in commercial arbitration falls at some midpoint on a continuum
Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. J.V.B. Indus., Inc., 894 F.2d 862, 871 (6th Cir. 1990)
(Martin, J., concurring).
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between the polar extremes of the summary, no-analysis award model and
the full-blown award that fully sets forth the arbitral analysis and
conclusions that lead to decision. A possible paradigm for that midpoint
model might be found in the very recent modification of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 52(a) that requires federal judges who decide cases without
a jury or with an advisory jury to recite the findings of fact and the law on
which judgment is based. 143
It is by no means clear that the judiciary's long-standing distrust of the
arbitration process' 44 has been summarily swept aside by the Supreme
Court's recent rejection of its prior suspicion of the process. Therefore, the
risk posed by substantive written awards revealing the arbitrator's basis for
decision cannot be entirely discounted. 145 Nevertheless, the Authors believe
that something more than a summary, no-analysis award will be necessary
in the mature model of commercial arbitration. Should the rule of the FAA
and UAA as to the exceedingly narrow grounds for vacation of the
arbitration award hold over time, the parties will soon learn the futility of
seeking a "second bite at the apple" in court when they are not satisfied
with the result achieved in arbitration. If the general rule of no judicial
review of the merits of the arbitrator's award continues to hold at the
maturity of the commercial arbitration process, demonstrating the accuracy
and correctness of the results achieved in arbitration by providing the
parties with insight into the arbitral fact-finding and decision process will be
143 FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
144 See, e.g., Stroh Container Co., 783 F.2d at 751 n.12 ("The present day penchant
for arbitration may obscure for many parties who do not have the benefit of hindsight that the
arbitration system is an inferior system of justice, structured without due process, rules of
evidence, accountability of judgment and rules of law."). See also Reicks v. Farmers
Commodities Corp., 474 N.W.2d 809, 811 (Iowa 1991) ("A refined quality of justice is not
the goal in arbitration matters. Indeed such a goal is deliberately sacrificed in favor of a sure
and speedy resolution . . . [i]t is no idle coincidence that the words "arbitration" and
"arbitrary" are both derived from the same Latin word.").
14 5 See Note, Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards in Federal Court:
Contemplating the Use and Utility of the Manifest Disregard of the Law Standard, 27 IND. L.
REv. 241, 262 (1993):
The various circuits are so divergent on what grounds are sufficient to vacate an arbitral
award that the law is essentially in a state of confusion. Because parties involved in the
arbitration process do not know what will justify vacation of arbitral awards, the courts are
forced to review many motions to vacate that border upon being frivolous.
See also Bret F. Randall, Note, The History, Application, and Policy of the Judicially Created
Standards ofReviewfor Arbitration Awards, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REv. 759.
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a crucial dimension of maintaining the faith of litigators and their clients in
the commercial arbitration process.
The desire to provide as few bases or excuses for appeal is
understandable. Nevertheless, the Authors contend that without objective
evidence of the rigor and completeness of the arbitral analysis underlying
the award, the attributes of expediency and simplicity offered by the present
mode of commercial arbitration may not over time be deemed of sufficient
value to outweigh the risks presented by a decision process that remains
unrevealed and is not subject to challenge. Competent decisions and
accurate, correct results are the hallmark of any adjudication mechanism
that can stand the test of the dispute resolution marketplace. Well thought-
out, rational written awards that demonstrate to the parties the manner in
which the dispute was decided are the most effective vehicle for
demonstrating that commercial arbitration consistently achieves that result.
Z A Final Thought: The Possibility of an Appellate Arbitration
Mechanism
Undoubtedly, it is the absence of a substantive guarantee of accurate
and correct results that causes many experienced litigators to be reluctant to
embrace commercial arbitration as an acceptable alternative to traditional
litigation. That fact prompts speculation as to the feasibility of the parties to
a given dispute agreeing contractually, at the outset of the arbitration
proceeding, to some form of appellate arbitration mechanism that would
provide a check on the otherwise unreviewable nature of the commercial
arbitration award. As incongruous as such a proposition may seem to those
who praise the relative simplicity and expediency of arbitration, the Authors
maintain it merits consideration.
The scope of such appellate arbitral review almost certainly would be
limited to the questions of law and application of law to fact decided by the
original tribunal. 14 6 Thus, like in traditional litigation, arbitral appellate
review would not extend to the findings of fact made in the original
adjudication. In order to facilitate effective appellate review of these
matters, the arbitrator(s) in the original adjudication would be required to
articulate, in writing, the findings of fact and conclusions of law upon
which the award is founded.
14 6 Because of the comparatively simple rules of procedure that will govern commercial
arbitration even at the mature stage, the Authors contend that providing arbitral appellate
review for alleged errors of procedure in the original arbitration would be ill-advised. Of
course, the parties would retain the discretion to resort to the court to enforce the procedural
rights afforded them by the Federal Arbitration Act and the various state adaptations of the
Uniform Arbitration Act.
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Procedure at this appellate stage of arbitration would be of a nature
similar to appellate practice in traditional litigation. The proper structure of
the appellate tribunal almost certainly would consist of three neutral
arbitrators, selected for their particular knowledge of the law and
intellectual capacity to perform the appellate review task. 147 The primary
procedural parameters of the process would be defined by setting timelines
for appeal of the original award and the submission of the arbitration record
and briefs to the appellate panel, stipulation as to the length and character of
any oral argument that is to be permitted, and specification of a deadline for
the appellate panel's decision. All of these characteristics of the appellate
step, as well as the nature and length of the appellate panel's award and the
scope of its remedial discretion (e.g., reversal of the original award, remand
to the tribunal below with instructions, or direction of a second arbitration,
de novo) likely would be determined as a function of the complexity of the
dispute balanced against the amount in controversy.
If structured properly in the agreement to arbitrate, this type of arbitral
appellate review seldom would require more than a few months from the
date of the original award. Concerns regarding additional expense and cost
could be largely ameliorated by a presumption that the use of the single
arbitrator format in the original adjudication is appropriate. Further
comfort, as well as assurance that the resort to the appellate mechanism
would not become a routine feature of commercial arbitration, could be
provided by an agreement in the submission document that, except for good
cause shown and as directed by the appellate panel, the loser on appeal
would be assessed all arbitral per diem charges, expenses, and costs or
attorneys' fees, or both, appurtenant to the appeal.
Whether arbitral appellate mechanisms of the type just described
become a common feature of commercial arbitration at the mature stage
remains to be seen. It does bear mention that by providing an arbitral
"safety net" whereby egregious errors of law or application of law to fact
can be corrected within the private arbitral framework, effective appellate
mechanisms might provide an important impetus to the judiciary to continue
to exercise restraint when asked to vacate or modify the result produced in
arbitration. Regardless, dialogue is called for here. In the Section below,
the final component of the mature commercial arbitration mechanism - the
commercial arbitrator who oversees the process - will be examined.
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147 Given the nature of the appellate review task, many retired judges would be
particularly well-qualified to serve in this capacity.
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VI. THE COMMERCIAL ARBITRATOR ARCHETYPE
The demands placed on the neutrals who will supervise the commercial
arbitration mechanism envisioned above will be substantial. The simple
truth is that many of those who today hold themselves out as commercial
arbitrators do not possess the subject matter expertise, the process-related
skills, or the analytical/award-writing competencies necessary to the
effective functioning of the mature model. Here, more than in any other
dimension of commercial arbitration, it is critical that a reasonable level of
expectation be established among advocates, parties, neutral appointing
authorities, and arbitrators as to what will be required of and delivered by
mainline commercial arbitrators. Once those expectation levels are defined,
they must be consistently satisfied.
A. The "Umpire" Model
The Authors foresee a commercial arbitration process guided by an
identifiable group of trusted professionals of unchallenged neutral standing.
At bottom, it will be the mainline commercial arbitrators who bear the
primary responsibility for creating and maintaining a commercial arbitration
mechanism that consistently strikes an optimal balance between the
attributes of the traditional litigation model and existing commercial
arbitration devices.
Mainline commercial arbitrators will be charged with guiding an
adjudicative process which produces expeditious calls that reflect acceptably
high levels of legal, factual, and "gut level" accuracy, correctness, and
reliability, while at the same time providing sufficient procedural and
substantive due process protections. When one realizes that these results
must be achieved without the safety net of a judicial appeals process
whereby significant errors of law or application of law to facts can be
corrected, the importance of ensuring adequate numbers of professional
arbitrators who have demonstrated their competence, sound judgment, and
capacity to make tough decisions wisely is crystallized.
Although not an entirely apt metaphor, the Authors find strong analogy
between their conceptualization of the mainline commercial arbitrator and
the umpires and referees charged with maintaining order and proper conduct
in the world of professional athletics. Those officials are given virtually
unreviewable authority to enforce the rules of the game being played. They
are expected to make expeditious calls in high-pressure, high-stakes
situations and to do so in a business as usual manner, all the while deftly
handling controversy and acrimony and keeping the proceedings focused
and running smoothly.
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Nevertheless, the officials in professional sports are not expected to be
perfect. The decision of professional sports owners to forego the
opportunity for achieving the greatly increased accuracy in the decisions of
those umpires and referees that can be facilitated by instant replay
technology, in favor of retaining the traditional system of instant
adjudication, speaks clearly to the willingness of the parties to entrust their
fates and their fortunes to a dispute resolution process founded on the
integrity and competence of a select group of seasoned, proven neutrals.
It is this same level of confidence in the process and the adjudicators to
which commercial arbitration and commercial arbitrators must aspire. The
optimal balance point that will produce that result lies at the fulcrum of the
tradeoff between the substantial guarantees of due process and correct
results provided by traditional litigation and the expediency, reduced
expense, and simplified procedure of commercial arbitration. The mainline
commercial arbitrators' competent striking of that balance will be sine qua
non to the institutionalization of the commercial arbitration process.
B. The Attributes of the Mainline Commercial Arbitrator
Having defined the formidable task faced by mainline commercial
arbitrators in the mature model, this inquiry now turns to a discussion of the
characteristics and virtues required of those individuals. Being charged with
standing in the place of the judicial system and judges is a sobering
responsibility. It will take a special breed of professional to withstand the
close scrutiny to which mainline commercial arbitrators will be subjected.
At the threshold, those who aspire to the profession must possess a
basic working knowledge of civil procedure and the substantive law at issue
in the types of controversies in which they wish to serve. The presumptive
credentials, although not necessary, indicating this subject matter expertise
is a law degree and relevant practice or teaching experience. Thoughtful
advocates will remain alert to the exceptional individuals who do not
possess a law degree who nevertheless have demonstrated a sufficient grasp
of civil procedure and the substantive law at issue in a particular
controversy to enable them to conduct a fair hearing and provide an
informed adjudication. Of course, there will remain a role for the non-
lawyer arbitrator in those disputes where the parties and counsel perceive
advantage in the multi-arbitrator format, assuming those neutrals are not
expected to serve as chair of the arbitration panel. 148
148 This observation reflects the Authors' beliefs that, with perhaps rare exception, the
chair of multi-arbitrator panels should be an attorney'with a sound grasp of hearing procedure,
evidence, and related matters.
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The remaining hallmarks of the mainline commercial arbitrator,
reflective of the individuals who will in fact do most of the work at the
mature stage of the process, are more difficult to ascertain and define.
Perhaps most susceptible to definition and objective verification is proven
acceptability as a neutral adjudicator, as demonstrated by repeated selections
and service in commercial disputes. However, if only those with prior
experience are deemed qualified to serve, inexperienced persons, even those
with high potential for becoming acceptable arbitrators, can never achieve
entry into the profession, and advocates and the parties they represent would
be denied the benefit of their services.
In order to avoid that dilemma and all of its undesirable side effects,
those who select arbitrators and those who aspire to serve as arbitrators
must look behind the selection decision and ask what it is that makes a
mainline commercial arbitrator acceptable. The Authors suggest that the
hallmarks of the mainline commercial arbitrator fall into two primary skills
categories: those associated with effective handling of the pre-hearing
proceedings and conduct of a fair hearing and those pertaining to the ability
to engage in effective legal analysis and, when requested to do so, write
cogent, thoughtful awards.
Among the indicia of a person capable of mastering the first category of
process-centered skills is previously demonstrated ability to cope with
conflict effectively, remaining goal- and process-focused while projecting
an unemotional, objective perspective. Certainly, individuals who have
earned reputations as effective, even-handed, and dispassionate negotiators
will predict well in this regard. Many respected litigators manifest these
qualities in their professional conduct. Similarly, many of those with prior
dispute resolution experience and proven acceptability in other fora (e.g.,
mediation), or as arbitrators in other fields (e.g., the labor arbitration
profession), can be reliably predicted to possess the process-centered skills
necessary to long-run acceptability as commercial arbitrators.
The second skills bundle required of the acceptable commercial
arbitrator goes to the ability to bring the threshold knowledge of the
relevant law and principles of contract interpretation to ground by ensuring
that the adjudicative result achieved is the product of lucid factual and legal
analysis. The best calisthenic for developing this faculty is deciding actual
cases. Those who have not had the opportunity to arbitrate an actual case
most likely will have developed and evidenced 'this proficiency in prior
writings or other exercises requiring application of law and contract
principles to real controversies. Thus, legal briefs written in an advocacy
mode, scholarly or other professional articles, or speeches and addresses
made in public or private venues can all serve to confirm the desired
quality. In addition, reputation in the legal community for insightful,
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thoughtful legal analysis can provide a reliable indication of the ability to
produce reasoned analysis and awards.
The final attribute is the most important. There are a substantial number
of lawyers and other professionals who are possessed of all or most of the
characteristics just identified. It is the Authors' belief that despite their
credentials, most of those people will not be well-suited to provide the
leadership and craftsman-like effort that will be required of arbitrators in the
mature model. The work of the mainline commercial arbitrator will more
often than not be solitary in nature and be performed in an environment that
is at once highly contentious, difficult, and intellectually challenging.
Individuals who view arbitration as an avocation, or little more than an
occasional, albeit pleasant diversion from retirement or other endeavors,
will have little hand in ensuring the maturation and institutionalization of
commercial arbitration. The Authors do not maintain that retired lawyers,
judges, and other professionals, as well as part-time neutrals do not have a
place in the mainstream of the arbitration profession at the mature stage.
Rather, what they assert is that: (1) arbitrators drawn from those two sub-
populations must be properly motivated and fully aware of the weighty
responsibilities that accompany the arbitral office; and (2) the commercial
arbitration corps cannot consist solely of retirees and part-time neutrals.
Only persons with the necessary intellectual firepower, unquestioned
integrity, and rigorous ethical standards, and a firm commitment to the
profession and competent practice will be deemed fit to serve over the long
run. What will be required of the mainline commercial arbitrator is a long-
term perspective and a willingness to serve an ongoing role in ensuring that
the commercial arbitration process consistently provides those who resort to
it with timely, fair, accurate, and correct adjudications of their disputes.
The work of commercial arbitration is a serious, often high-stakes game that
requires serious, committed adjudicators.
Describing the commercial arbitrator archetype that will stand at the
core of the profession in the mature model is a relatively simple task. The
keys to developing sufficient numbers of competent neutrals to fill that role
is a more complex matter, one that must be a subject of the dialogue the
Authors propose.
C. The Creation of a Sufficient Corps of Professional Commercial
Arbitrators
In an earlier Section of this Article, the Authors discussed their views
regarding the need to supplement and upgrade existing paradigms for the
initial credentialing of commercial arbitrators, the importance of providing
some form of meaningful arbitrator performance evaluation, and the
changes necessary to facilitate more informed arbitrator selection decisions.
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As important as those steps will be, they are the more pedestrian, easy to
accomplish dimensions of the larger arbitrator development strategy that
must be devised.
The effective, competent practice of commercial arbitration requires the
highest levels of intellectual skill, integrity, and professionalism. Despite
this reality, to date little attention has been paid to the matters typically of
concern to the members of an important profession to which society has
assigned weighty responsibilities. Most important among these is the
fashioning of a vision of how those who wish to master the craft gain entry
into it, move from apprentice to journeyman status, and eventually ascend
to the master craftsman level. Until a clearer conceptualization of the career
path of the mainline commercial arbitrator is achieved, it is unlikely that an
identifiable, cohesive group of practitioners with the necessary level of
commitment to the profession will emerge.
The reality is that current arbitrator development programs provide
little more than the most rudimentary training in the basics of hearing
conduct and the relevant substantive law. This is not very sophisticated
training, and it leaves many nascent arbitrators ill-prepared for the rigors of
the hearing room and arbitral decision-making. A first step in upgrading
these existing arbitrator training programs might be to look beyond the
more rudimentary subjects to topics like effective handling of the pre-
hearing stage (e.g., pre-hearing motion practice, discovery, mediation),
models for effective case analysis and award drafting, dealing with and
defusing the often rancorous relationship between counsel, and the
importance of de-emotionalizing the process. A second important step in
this regard might be the establishment of well thought-out, rigorous
programs of continuing education intended to keep active commercial
arbitrators apace of the evolving law and related matters in their areas of
practice.
At the same time, it is important to remember the limitations of
traditional classroom training. Arbitration is a craft that is best learned
through experience, personal and vicarious. There is little evidence of
effective use of mentoring arrangements and apprenticeship programs in the
commercial arbitration field. These devices have proven their worth in labor
arbitration, and should be utilized in the commercial arbitration realm.
An additional step on the career path for entry into the commercial
arbitration trade might be to require that new arbitrators sit in on the
hearings and attendant decision conferences of several experienced, diverse
neutrals. This experience could extend to analyzing the cases observed to
final decision as a sort of "shadow arbitrator," followed up by a discussion
and critique from the experienced arbitrator(s) actually assigned to decide
the observed case. The practice, the additional perspective, and the sense of
continuity from one generation of the profession to the next gained through
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these types of experience can be invaluable to the new and the experienced
neutral and will almost certainly enhance the performance of both.
Another means to maximize the experiential learning opportunities
available to new arbitrators might be the direct appointment by the neutral
appointing authorities of such individuals to arbitrate relatively simple, low-
stakes disputes on a pro bono or limited fee basis. The parties willing to
submit their controversies to this procedure would reap the benefit of a
prompt, no or low-fee decision while providing an otherwise inexperienced
arbitrator with the opportunity to be tested under fire.
Whatever shape these enhanced arbitrator development programs
eventually take, it is essential to remember that their goal is to produce a
group of self-involved craftsmen, unequivocally dedicated to the profession
of dispute resolution who can be trusted to consistently produce appropriate
outcomes in even difficult, contentions cases. Arbitrators of that caliber are
not produced in a few weeks, months, or even years. In all but the most
exceptional instances, one does not somehow magically transform from
competent attorney or business professional to competent arbitrator merely
by changing chairs and adopting a new appellation. Rather, the true
craftsmen we envision who will lead the commercial arbitration profession
into the next century will have spent many years accruing and sharpening
their skills, learning through achievement and error, and establishing their
acceptability by surviving the test of the commercial dispute resolution
marketplace over the long haul. Viable arbitrator development programs
must contemplate this fact and be configured so as to be a significant
component of that long-run process.
D. The Final Component of the Development of the Commercial
Arbitrator Archetype
As the cadre of the true professional, career neutral begins to emerge
and to define itself over the next several years, the final step in the
evolution of the commercial arbitration profession will begin. That step will
be the development of a shared professional identity and conscience among
the mainline practitioners of the craft. The absence of this essential
professional core is one of the major voids limiting the commercial
arbitration process today.
The task of shepherding the commercial arbitration profession to
maturity is most appropriately taken up by the mainline arbitrators who sit
at its center. It is unrealistic to expect this leadership role to forever be
assumed by neutral appointing authorities like the American Arbitration
Association, Endispute, or JAMS. Just as the American Medical
Association leads the medical profession and the American Bar Association
leads the legal profession, the most appropriate organizational vehicle for
412
[Vol. 10:2 1995]
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN EVOLUTION
leading the commercial arbitration profession is the yet-to-be formed
professional association of commercial arbitrators. In the very near future,
the groundwork for this organization must be put into place. Existing
professional groups like the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution
(SPIDR) are too diffuse or too non-selective to stand at the apex of the
commercial arbitration profession and provide it with the guidance and
conscience it must have. The organization we envision must be built from
the ground up.
The most useful model for this organization is the National Academy of
Arbitrators which sits at the pinnacle of the labor arbitration profession.
One gains election to the National Academy only after accruing a sufficient
number of years in the profession and issuing a number of awards adequate
to demonstrate broad acceptability as an arbitrator of labor-management
disputes. 14 9 The National Academy, in conjunction with the American
Arbitration Association and the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service,
played the key role in promulgating the Code of Professional Conduct for
Labor Arbitrators that governs neutral conduct in the labor arbitration
profession.
The National Academy of Arbitrators polices the professional conduct
of its members and convenes semi-annual meetings that constitute the
primary intellectual fora for the exploration and debate of issues affecting
the profession and process of labor arbitration. The Proceedings of the
Academy's Annual Meetings are published in hard back form by the highly-
respected Bureau of National Affairs and constitute a major vehicle for
dialogue and debate among labor arbitrators and the advocates who argue
cases before them. In sum, the National Academy of Arbitrators serves as
the professional standard bearer, the intellectual engine, and the conscience
of the labor arbitration profession. The time to begin the development of a
parallel organization to serve and lead the commercial arbitration process is
now.
VII. CONCLUSION
There remains today substantial question as to whether the process of
commercial arbitration will achieve the level of rigor and reliability
necessary to justify the continued, long-run deference of the judiciary in
business disputes that otherwise would be appropriate for adjudication in the
state or federal courts. If it does not, the window of opportunity created by
149 Currently, the minimum number of issued awards necessary for application to the
National Academy of Arbitrators is 50 over a five-year period. The de facto standard for
actual admission to the National Academy is closer to 100 awards over that same five-year
period.
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the interaction of the U.S. Supreme Court's current charitable view of the
process, the logjam in the courts, and the concerns of business
decisionmakers with the costs and other problems associated with traditional
litigation may prove to be short-lived.
It would be a most egregious error and the height of vanity for the
champions of commercial arbitration to believe that the courts, state
legislatures, and Congress will stand idly by if, over time, arbitration fails
to provide the parties that employ it with a dispute resolution mechanism
that is cost effective, procedurally consistent, and fair, and capable, as a
matter of course, of producing outcomes that are accurate and correct. In
the same manner, the parties themselves and the attorneys who represent
their interests will not long remain committed to the commercial arbitration
process if their expectations in this regard are not consistently met.
The decision by business executives to utilize arbitration in lieu of
permitting commercial disputes to proceed to traditional litigation is based
on an implicit risk-return assessment. The risks of submitting one's business
fortunes, a priori, to a private system of adjudication, virtually immune
from judicial interference or usurpation are considerable. Commercial
arbitration will continue to prosper only for so long as it produces returns
sufficient to outweigh the risks its adoption entails.
The current uproar, circa mid-1994, over the arbitration of employee
fair employment practices claims in the securities industry is a prime
example of how the advocates of commercial arbitration can stumble when
they fail to pay adequate attention to the design of the arbitration
mechanism, the careful credentialing and selection of arbitrators, the
provision of adequate levels of due process guarantees, and ensuring an
appropriate level of on-the-record decision-making. By adopting wholesale,
without modification, an arbitration mechanism originally intended to
resolve broker-client disputes over matters pertaining to the trading of
securities (largely concerned with simple claims of fraud and/or
misrepresentation) to the adjudication of complex statutory-based claims of
employment discrimination brought by brokerage firm employees, the
National Association of Securities Dealers and the New York Stock
Exchange have prompted legitimate expressions of concern among the civil
rights plaintiffs' bar, the press, and several members of Congress. 150 This
very serious oversight by the officials in charge of the securities industry
150 See Employment Discrimination, supra note 12; see also Steven A. Holmes, Arbiters
of Bias in Securities Industry Have Slight Experience in Labor Law, N.Y. TIMEs, April 5,
1994, at 86; Margaret A. Jacobs, Required Job-Bias Arbitration Stirs Critics, WALL ST. J.,
June 22, 1994, at B5; Margaret A. Jacobs, Riding Crop and Slurs: How Wall St. Dealt with a
Sex Bias Case, WALL ST. J., June 9, 1994, at Al.
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arbitration mechanism must be quickly remedied, lest the courts or
Congress act in their stead.
That there are viable alternatives to the commercial arbitration process
is demonstrated by the appearance of experiments like the recently-initiated
Sta-Fed ADR Inc. organization in Hartford, Connecticut. In 1993, the
Connecticut state legislature authorized the creation of this private, non-
profit mediation service that employs sitting federal and state and senior
federal judges, working nights to provide mediation services to litigants
under the auspices of the state-sanctioned mediation program.1 51 There is
also the possibility that the judiciary may sanction new, innovative devices
whereby judges, magistrates, and similar judicial officials would be
permitted, with the agreement of the parties, to decide disputes in their
judicial capacities under informal, expedited procedures.' 52 Finally, there
exists the possibility that the ultimate authority to adjudicate commercial
disputes in an alternative mode could also be returned to the federal and
state judiciaries through judicial or legislative approval of a special master-
like device whereby judges would themselves designate neutral parties to
hear and decide commercial disputes that the parties did not wish to submit
to traditional court trial. 153
The blessing recently granted the process of commercial arbitration by
the U.S. Supreme Court is both a boon and a challenge. By taking the
process from the fringes of litigation and placing it squarely in the forefront
of the commercial dispute resolution arena, Mitsubishi and its progeny have
vastly accelerated and indeed compelled the maturation of commercial
arbitration. The challenge of creating in a short period of time a system of
private adjudication that leaves disputants and their attorneys satisfied that
they would have gained nothing of importance by utilizing the highly-
developed system of civil justice provided by the federal and state courts is
daunting to say the least.
The Authors assert that the institutionalization, the permanence of
commercial arbitration, is by no means assured. The present absence of a
151 Kirk Johnson, Public Judges as Private Contractors: A Legal Frontier, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 10, 1993, at D20.
152 See, e.g., DDI Seamless Cylinder Int'l, Inc. v. General Fire Extinguisher Corp., 14
F.3d 1163, 1166 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Parties are free within broad limits to agree on simplified
procedures for the decision of their case."). In this opinion, Judge Posner observed that an
agreement between two parties to a dispute in federal distkict court that a magistrate judge
would make a decision on a limited record and arguments pertaining only to that limited
record, and that they would not appeal the judge's decision would be deemed "not improper."
Id.
153 See Stephen L. Hayford, The Coming Third Era ofLabor Arbitration, ARB. J., Sept.
1993, at 8-17, 77-99.
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true core, a sense of identity and mission, a gestalt around which to build
the profession of commercial arbitration indicates a certain shallowness, a
lack of substance that does not bode well for the ability of the process to
stand in the place of the state and federal judiciaries, especially in complex,
high-stakes disputes. There are serious concerns about the ability of a few
highly-entrepreneurial, unregulated private organizations and a large group
of essentially self-labeled "arbitrators" of widely-divergent qualifications,
competencies, and perspectives to lead the task of securing commercial
arbitration's long-run viability and establishing the foundation for a bona
fide profession.
It is for this reason that the Authors reassert their earlier contention that
all of the persons and organizations with a stake in the successful maturation
of commercial arbitration must become involved in a rigorous,
comprehensive public dialogue, including substantial efforts at empirical
research, intended to thoughtfully shape the form and character of the
process and the neutrals who will be key to its effective operation. Set forth
in the text above is a first conceptualization of the primary focuses of that
dialogue, and, as a starting point for the dialogue, the Authors' views on
those subjects. It remains now for the others with a voice in this matter to
step forward and engage.
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